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Abstract
What determines the optimal monetary trade-o§ between internal objectives (inflation,
and output gap) and external objectives (competitiveness and trade imbalances) when inef-
ficient capital flows cause exchange rate misalignment and distort current account positions?
We characterize this trade-o§ analytically, using the workhorse model of modern monetary
theory in open economies under incomplete markets–where ine¢cient capital flows and
exchange rate misalignments can arise independently of nominal distortions. We derive a
quadratic approximation of the utility-based global policy loss function under fairly general
assumptions on preferences and openness, and solve for the optimal targeting rules under co-
operation. We show that, in economies with a low degree of exchange rate pass-through, the
optimal response to ine¢cient capital inflows associated with real appreciation is contrac-
tionary, above and beyond the natural rate: the optimal policy curbs excessive demand at
the cost of exacerbating currency overvaluation. In contrast, a high degree of pass-through,
and/or low trade elasticities, warrants expansionary policies that lean against exchange rate
appreciation and competitive losses, at the cost of ine¢cient inflation.
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“Better macro performance comes from a monetary rule that recognizes how an
external deficit raises the natural real rate of interest.” Obstfeld and Rogo§ [2010]
p. 34.
1 Introduction
External deficits and large swings in exchange rates associated with cross-border capital flows
confront monetary authorities with complex trade-o§s between price stability, growth, trade
imbalances and exchange rate competitiveness. In the actual experience of policy-making, the
trade-o§s between these “internal” and “external” objectives are often resolved in di§erent
ways. Drawing on the experience of industrialized countries, a case in point is the monetary
policy response to capital inflows and widening external deficits in Germany and the United
States in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Bundesbank responded to external deficits in the
aftermath of German unification by adopting a contractionary monetary stance for a long time
period, during which capital inflows into the country translated into a steep appreciation of the
D-mark in nominal and real terms. In contrast, in the second half of the 1990s, when the global
“Saving Glut” envisioned by Bernanke [2005] started to to cause the dollar exchange rate to
appreciate and created a significant deterioration of the US current account, the US monetary
authorities kept their monetary stance persistently accommodative.1 The issue is again coming
into consideration at the time of writing, since central banks on the recovery path from the
Great Recession are lifting rates from the zero lower bound. In this process, the United States
is experiencing increasing capital inflows, while the euro area is experiencing sizeable current
account surpluses. How should these di§erent external developments be factored into an e¢cient
stabilization policy?
The question we address in this paper concerns what determines the optimal monetary
trade-o§ between internal objectives (inflation, and output gap) and external objectives (com-
petitiveness and trade imbalances) in the face of ine¢cient capital flows that cause exchange
rate misalignment and distort current account positions. We provide an answer using the work-
horse open economy monetary model with incomplete markets–the two-country New Keynesian
model in which the only internationally traded asset is an non-contingent bond (as in the seminal
contribution by Obstfeld and Rogo§ [1995]; see also Costinot et al. [2015] and Davila and Ko-
rinek [2017]). Our point of departure is the conventional wisdom that net inflows of capital raise
the natural rate of interest, hence should be matched by a tighter monetary stance–synthesized
by Obstfeld and Rogo§ [2010] in the quote opening this paper. In the presence of financial mar-
ket imperfections, however, the natural rate allocation is not necessarily a desirable compass for
stabilization policy. Because shocks are not fully insurable in a bond economy, pecuniary exter-
nalities make the real exchange rate misaligned, independently of nominal rigidities — the same
core financial market distortion analyzed in Costinot et al. [2015]. As a result, the valuation of
current and future national outputs is distorted, and so are the incentives to borrow and lend
across borders. Similarly to their valuation e§ects on outstanding foreign assets and liabilities
1See Eichengreen and Wyplosz [1993] and Buiter et al. [1998]. Systematic evidence on the monetary response
to capital inflows is scarce. Kruger and Pasricha [2016] and Pasricha [2017] document that a neutral or an
expansionary stance is actually as frequent as a contractionary one. An early study stressing procyclicality in
monetary policy is Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh [2004].
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stressed by the literature (see, e.g., Gourinchas and Rey [2014]), exchange rate movements drive
di§erences in national wealth by a§ecting the present discounted value of a country’s output
(namely, the natural borrowing constraint in a bond economy). With financial market frictions,
real exchange rate misalignments thus induce an ine¢cient wealth wedge across countries.
Our main result consists of showing analytically that the optimal monetary response to
ine¢cient capital inflows is not necessarily contractionary, and does not follow the natural rate.
Instead, it depends on structural features that are inherent to open economies: the degree of
exchange rate pass-through and the elasticity of output to the real exchange rate. The role
played by these features in shaping the optimal monetary stance squares with basic economic
intuition. In response to excessive capital inflows that over-appreciate the Home currency, it is
optimal to tighten the Home monetary stance when exchange rate misalignment has little impact
on competitiveness and growth (owing to low exchange rate pass-through). The optimal stance,
however, is more contractionary than required by the natural rate compass, up to causing
a fall in consumer price index (CPI) inflation. Conversely, it is optimal to pursue a Home
monetary expansion that mitigates the real exchange rate appreciation, despite its inflationary
e§ect on aggregate demand, when competitiveness and growth are sensitive to exchange rate
misalignment (due to a high exchange rate pass-through, and/or a low trade elasticity). The
direction of adjustment in this case lends theoretical support to views that are critical of the
natural rate prescriptions (see, e.g., Eichengreen [2011]).
Our analysis has significant implications for exchange rate volatility and external imbalances.
In our characterization of the optimal policy, low pass-through strenghtens the welfare incentives
to stabilize aggregate demand, even if this means exacerbating currency movements. Our results
suggest that, with incomplete markets, optimal stabilization will tend to raise exchange rate
volatility in economies where import and export prices do not fully adjust to exchange rate
movements, relative to economies characterized by a high degree of exchange rate pass-through.
We also show that, by leaning against appreciation, an expansionary stance discourages capital
inflows–with the notable exception of economies with a trade elasticity well below unity, where
the optimal policy boosts demand and, irrespective of the degree of pass-through, domestic
borrowing.
In deriving these results, our paper makes at least two novel contributions to the literature.
First, it provides a second-order accurate approximation of the global welfare function and op-
timal targeting rules under cooperation for the standard New Keynesian two-country model
with incomplete markets. The welfare function encompasses di§erent models of exchange rate
pass-through (ERPT)–with export prices being sticky either in the currency of the producers
(producer currency pricing or PCP, whereas ERPT is complete) or in the currency of the desti-
nation market (local currency pricing or LCP, whereas ERPT is incomplete).2 The derivation
of this function does not rely on specific forms of market incompleteness (e.g., bond economies
and financial autarky obtain as special cases), nor on restrictive assumptions about preferences
(e.g., it is not restricted to the case of unitary trade elasticity). We show that in addition to
output gaps and inflation rates, the arguments of the welfare function include real exchange
rate misalignment and relative demand misallocation, themselves a function of ine¢cient capital
2We focus here on the the two symmetric cases of ERPT, leaving the analysis of the asymmetric case, the
dominant currency pricing (DCP) recently emphasized by Gopinath [2016], to future work.
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flows. Combined, these arguments define a “wealth gap” that turns out to play a key role in
optimal policy design. Based on our general loss function, we characterize and discuss optimal
targeting rules under both PCP and LCP for economies that trade only non-contingent bonds
across borders. These rules hold for a wide range of shocks (including preferences, productivity,
markups, etc., current or anticipated), but, unlike the welfare function, are specific to bond
economies.3
Second, the paper derives a transparent analytical characterization of macroeconomic dy-
namics under the optimal monetary policy in economies in which ine¢cient capital flows are due
to anticipated or “news shocks.” The news shocks may stem from political risk (i.e., anticipa-
tion of capital controls; see, e.g., Acharya and Bengui [2015]), the strength of financial frictions
(see, e.g., Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] and Cavallino [2016]), technology or preferences imping-
ing on savings–without loss of generality, we focus on the latter. In the first-best (complete
market and flex-price) allocation, even though households are forward looking, relative prices
and quantities depend only on the current-period (exogenous) fundamentals, not on their ex-
pected realizations in the future–in line with the well-known results in Barro and King [1984].4
Relative to this benchmark, under incomplete markets, the entire cross-border flow of capital
that responds to news shocks is ine¢cient. Remarkably, we show that in model specifications
that are standard in the literature, capital flows in response to news shocks are exogenous to
monetary policy and macroeconomic adjustment. We can thus bring our study to bear directly
on a case often debated in policy circles, where monetary policy can only mitigate the e§ects
of ine¢cient capital flows on domestic macroeconomic dynamics, but cannot curb their size.5
Two specific results are worth stressing. First, from the vantage point of monetary policy-
making, ine¢cient capital inflows open gaps that act much like endogenous “markup” shocks–
they raise trade-o§s between inflation and the output gap. However, while the exogenous
markup shocks typically assumed in the monetary literature create aggregate global distortions,
we show that the ine¢ciencies from capital inflows have opposing e§ects on di§erent economies,
that cancel out in the aggregate. A key implication is that, under the optimal policy, the
Home and Foreign monetary stance will be symmetric but with the opposite sign.6 Second,
our analysis identifies structural features (i.e., shocks and ranges of trade elasticities) such that
capital inflows may actually depreciate the domestic currency and depress domestic demand. In
these cases, the optimal monetary response is unambiguously expansionary, to sustain domestic
activity, in both LCP and PCP economies. We show that the theoretical core of this result
rests on the classical controversy on the transfer problem–originally debated by Keynes and
Ohlin concerning the war reparation imposed on Germany after World War I, and more recently
reconsidered in the debate on current account rebalancing (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogo§ [2005]).
To characterize the optimal policy as transparently as possible, we initially focus on a
baseline specification that we dub the Cole and Obstfeld (CO) economy, following Cole and
3For an analysis of optimal policy under financial autarky and PCP, see Corsetti Dedola and Leduc [2010].
4Recall that in the workhorse monetary model we use in our analysis, preferences are time separable and
there is no capital accumulation. See Devereux and Engel [2006, 2009] for an analysis of the optimal monetary
response to news shocks under complete markets.
5 In addition, a specification after Cole and Obstfeld [1991] enhances comparability with seminal contributions
to the literature (e.g., Clarida et al. [2002]) that impose similar restrictions on parameters.
6This is in contrast with the optimal response to the exogenous markup shocks commonly assumed by the
monetary literature, which may be symmetric across borders, in particular under LCP (see e.g. Corsetti et al.
[2010] page 902-904).
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Obstfeld [1991]. This baseline specification sets a unitary trade elasticity, complemented by the
assumption of log consumption utility and a linear disutility of labor (the latter is relevant for
tractability in the LCP case, as importantly shown by Engel [2011]). We then generalize our
results to the case of non-unitary trade elasticity, showing that the analytical characterization
of the optimal monetary stance in the CO economies still provides tight guidance for policy
analysis for su¢ciently large trade elasticities.
Literature Our analysis builds on a vast body of work that, over the last two decades, has
redefined open economy macroeconomics (see Benigno and Benigno [2003]; Clarida, Galí and
Gertler [2002]; Corsetti and Pesenti [2005]; Devereux and Engel [2003]; Engel [2011]; Ferrero,
Gertler, and Svensson [2008]; and Galí and Monacelli [2005], among others, as discussed in
Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc [2010]).7 It is nonetheless useful to emphasize two strands of this
literature that help highlight our contribution.
The first is the literature epitomized by Engel [2011], who studies optimal policy under
deviations from the law of one price via LCP into the otherwise canonical open economy New
Keynesian model developed by Clarida, Galí and Gertler [2002]. In this literature, risk sharing
is perfect so that ine¢cient capital flows, demand misallocation and real exchange rate misalign-
ment are the products of nominal rigidities only. A key result stressed by Engel [2011] for LCP
economies is that monetary policy can support a constrained-optimal allocation with CPI-price
stability and no exchange rate misalignement–under complete markets, this also closes any
cross-country demand gaps (as defined in Section 3.1 below). Our paper complements this liter-
ature by stressing that the simplest form of financial market imperfections, incomplete financial
markets, rules out this possibility. With incomplete risk sharing, there is always a trade-o§
between price stability and misalignment, as real exchange rate misalignment and cross-country
demand gaps are no longer proportional to each other.8 This is so independently of whether
ERPT is complete (PCP) or incomplete (LCP).9 As shown in our analysis, however, ERPT
is crucial in determining the optimal monetary stance and the extent to which exchange rate
misalignment is stabilized.
The second strand of the literature includes a small number of contributions that, like ours,
provide analytical characterizations of the optimal monetary policy in two-country models with
incomplete financial markets.10 Obstfeld and Rogo§ [2002] and Devereux [2004] examine static
frameworks without capital flows, and in which prices are set one period in advance–therefore,
necessarily abstracting from the welfare implications of current account dynamics and inflation.
Devereux and Sutherland [2007] study a dynamic setting similar to ours, but in which markets
are e§ectively complete under flexible prices so that price stability also attains the e¢cient
natural rate allocation.11 Under PCP, Benigno [2009] emphasizes deviations from price stability,
7Most of the papers in the literature either assume complete markets or close to e¢cient capital flows because
of particular restrictions on preference and technology parameters.
8 In the tradition of Obstfeld and Rogo§ [1995], we capture the lack of e¢cient diversification in the data
despite the number of seemingly available cross-border assets, by focusing on bond economies. However, we do
not restrict preferences to have a unit elasticity, unlike Clarida, Galí and Gertler [2002] and Engel [2011].
9The same is true whether ERPT is symmetric or asymmetric across borders–the case of DCP recently
emphasized by Gopinath [2016]. Focusing on this case in a small open economy, Casas et al. [2016] shows that
the optimal policy trade-o§s price stability with other objectives.
10Other contributions have looked at similar issues in a small open economy framework–see e.g. De Paoli
[2009].
11Tille [2005] assesses the welfare impact of integrating international asset markets with nominal rigidities and
5
in economies in which net foreign asset holdings are asymmetrical in the nonstochastic steady
state. However, the focus is on economies in which deviations from both purchasing power
parity (PPP) and the law of one price are assumed away, in contrast with the analysis of real
exchange rate misalignment at the core of optimal policy design analyzed in our paper.
Monetary policy with incomplete financial markets is the focus of recent numerical analyses
by Rabitsch [2012], who revisits the benefits from international cooperation, and Senay and
Sutherland [2016], who study the properties of optimal rules in a incomplete markets model
with bonds and equities. Unlike our analysis, in their setting monetary policy also operates by
manipulating the risk-sharing properties of assets–essentially, via their impact on the exchange
rate (and prices)–monetary policy moves the ex post return on assets contingent on shocks.
In our analysis, however, we focus on the more conventional channel of monetary transmission,
operating exclusively by a§ecting current and anticipated real rates.12
Our study is naturally related to recent literature that emphasizes the role of pecuniary
externalities under collateral constraints, financial accelerator (balance-sheet) e§ects and over-
and underborrowing relative to the [constrained-) e¢cient allocation [see Benigno et al. [2010];
Bianchi [2011]; Bianchi and Mendoza [2010]; Costinot et al. [2015]; Davila and Korinek [2017];
Fahri and Werning [2015]; and Lorenzoni [2008], among others).13 Devereux and Yu [2016]
characterize optimal monetary policy under discretion in a small open economy with occa-
sionally binding borrowing constraints. Relative to these papers, our contribution considers a
standard framework with natural borrowing constraints on short-term debt, which, in equi-
librium, respond to both exogenous shocks and the endogenous real appreciation created by
ine¢cient capital inflows–indeed an appreciation relaxes the natural borrowing constraint, by
raising the international value of (present discounted) domestic output. A distinct feature is
our specific focus on monetary policy in a global equilibrium characterized by overborrowing
(and obviously underborrowing in the other country) with respect to both the first-best and the
constrained-e¢cient allocation.
Last, but not least, our results are in line with Woodford [2009], showing that financial
integration does not compromise monetary control, i.e., the ability of the central bank to pur-
sue a desired monetary stance. Yet, as stressed by Rey [2013] and Fahri and Werning [2015],
ine¢cient capital flows may create adverse trade-o§s across policy goals, hampering a central
bank’s ability to maintain the economy on an e¢cient path. Our main contribution is to inspect
the monetary policy trade-o§s created by capital flows, and characterize the optimal monetary
response that can provide a fungible first-line defence in the absence of other readily imple-
mentable measures, or complement other policy instruments–ranging from macroprudential
policy to capital controls–when these are in place.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section synthetically goes over the
standard two-good, two-country, New Keynesian model that we take as the framework for our
analysis. Section 3 derives the global loss function, discussing each of its arguments in some
a stochastic component in monetary policy.
12A number of other papers numerically solve open economy models under incomplete markets, and examine
optimal policy often using ad hoc loss functions. See, for example, Kollmann [2003] and Bergin and Tchakarov
[2003].
13Cavallino [2016] examines foreign exchange interventions as a second instrument (in addition to conventional
interest rate policy) available to the central bank to redress ine¢cient capital flows in an economy with borrowing
constraints similar to those of Gabaix and Maggiori [2015].
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detail, and characterizes the cooperative optimal targeting rules under PCP and LCP. Section
4 studies optimal monetary stabilization policy under PCP and LCP in CO economies whereas
capital flows are independent of policy. In section 5, we generalize our results for the case of
non unitary trade elasticity. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model economy
The analysis builds on the standard open economy version of the workhorse model in monetary
economics (see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler [2002] and Engel [2011]], with well-known char-
acteristics. The world economy consists of two countries of equal size, H and F . Each country
specializes in one type of tradable good, produced in a number of varieties or brands defined
over a continuum of unit mass. Brands of tradable goods are indexed by h 2 [0, 1] in the Home
country and f 2 [0, 1] in the Foreign country. Firms producing the goods are monopolistic
supplier of one brand only and use labor as the only input to production. These firms set prices
either in local or producer currency units and in a staggered fashion as in Calvo [1983]. Asset
markets are complete at the national level, but incomplete internationally.
In what follows, we describe our set-up focusing on the Home country, with the under-
standing that similar expressions also characterize the Foreign economy–variables referring to
Foreign firms and households are marked with an asterisk.
2.1 The household’s problem
2.1.1 Preferences
We consider a cashless economy in which the representative Home agent maximizes the expected
value of her lifetime utility, where instantaneous utility U is a function of a consumption index,
C, and (negatively) of labor e§ort L, specialized as follows:
U [Ct, Lt] = ζC,t
C1−σt
1− σ − κ
L1+η
1 + η
, σ, η > 0 (1)
whereas the model also allows for shocks to marginal utilities of consumption ζC,t. Foreign
agents’ preferences are symmetrically defined. Households consume both domestically produced
and imported goods. We define Ct(h) as the Home agent’s consumption as of time t of the Home
good h; similarly, Ct(f) is the Home agent’s consumption of the imported good f . We assume
that each good h (or f) is an an imperfect substitute for all other goods’ varieties, with constant
elasticity of substitution θ > 1:
CH,t ≡
!Z 1
0
Ct(h)
θ−1
θ dh
# θ
θ−1
, CF,t ≡
!Z 1
0
Ct(f)
θ−1
θ df
# θ
θ−1
. (2)
The full consumption basket, Ct, in each country, aggregates Home and Foreign goods
according to the following standard CES function:
Ct ≡
h
a
1/φ
H CH,t
φ−1
φ + a
1/φ
F CF,t
φ−1
φ
i φ
φ−1
, φ > 0, (3)
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where aH and aF are the weights on the consumption of Home and Foreign traded goods,
respectively, and φ is the constant (trade) elasticity of substitution between CH,t and CF,t.
2.1.2 Price indexes
The price index of the Home goods is given by:
PH,t =
!Z 1
0
Pt(h)
1−θ
dh
# 1
1−θ
, (4)
and the price index associated with the consumption basket, Ct, is:
Pt =
h
aHP
1−φ
H,t + aFP
1−φ
F,t
i 1
1−φ
. (5)
Let Et denote the Home nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of Home currency per unit
of Foreign currency. The real exchange rate (RER) is customarily defined as the ratio of CPIs
expressed in the same currency, i.e., Qt = EtP
∗
t
Pt
. The terms of trade (TOT) are instead defined
as the relative price of domestic imports in terms of exports: Tt = PF,tEtP ∗H,t
if firms set prices in
local currency and
EtP ∗F,t
PH,t
under producer currency pricing.
2.1.3 Budget constraints
Home and Foreign agents trade an international bond, BH, which pays in units of Home currency
and is zero in net supply. Households derive income from working, wtLt, from domestic firms’
profits, Π(h), lump-sum transfers Tt, and from interest payments, (1 + it)BH,t, where it is the
nominal bond’s yield, paid at the beginning of period t but known at time t − 1. Households
use their disposable income to consume and invest in state-contingent assets. The individual
flow budget constraint for the representative agent j in the Home country is therefore:
PH,tCH,t + PF,tCF,t +BH,t+1 ≤ wtLt + (1 + it−1)BH,t +
Z 1
0
Π(h)dh+ Tt. (6)
The household’s problem thus consists of maximizing lifetime utility, defined by (1), subject to
the constraint (6).
2.2 Firms
Firms employ domestic labor to produce a di§erentiated product h according to the following
linear production function:
Y (h) = ζY L (h) , (7)
where L (h) is the demand for labor by the producer of the good h and ζY is a technology shock
common to all producers in the Home country, which follows a statistical process to be specified
below.
Firms are subject to nominal rigidities à la Calvo so that, at any time t, they keep their
price fixed with probability α. We assume that when firms update their prices, they do so
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simultaneously in the Home and Foreign markets. Following the literature, we consider two
models of nominal price distortions in the export markets. According to the first model, firms
can set prices in local currencies – this is the LCP hypothesis. The maximization problem is
then as follows:
MaxP(h),P∗(h) Et
( 1X
k=0
pbt,t+kα
k
 )Pt(h)Dt+k(h) + EtP∗t (h)D∗t+k(h)*−
MCt+k(h)
)
Dt+k(h) +D
∗
t+k(h)
* !) (8)
where pbt,t+k is the firm’s stochastic nominal discount factor between t and t+k, and the firm’s
demand at Home and abroad is given by:
Dt(h) =
Z -Pt(h)
PH,t
.−θ
CH,tdh
D∗t (h) =
Z  P∗t (h)
P ∗H,t
!−θ
C∗H,tdh
In these expressions, PH,t and P ∗H,t denote the price index of Home goods in the Home and
Foreign countries – the latter expressed in Foreign currency.
By the first-order condition of the producer’s problem, the optimal price Pt(h) in domestic
currency charged to domestic customers is:
Pt(h) = θ
θ − 1
Et
1X
k=0
αkpbt,t+kDt+k(h)MCt+k(h)
Et
1X
k=0
αkpbt,t+kDt+k(h)
; (9)
while the price (in foreign currency) charged to customers in the Foreign country is:
P∗t (h) =
θ
θ − 1
Et
1X
k=0
αkpbt,t+kD
∗
t+k(h)MCt+k(h)
Et
1X
k=0
αkpbt,t+kEt+kD∗t+k(h)
. (10)
According to the alternative model, we posit that firms set prices in the producer currency
– this is the PCP hypothesis. In this case, exchange rate pass-through is complete. Given
that demand elasticities are the same across markets, in domestic currency the price charged
to foreign consumers is the same as the optimal price charged at Home: the law of one price
holds: P∗t (h) = Pt(h)/Et. The optimal price is similar to (9), whereas Home demand is replaced
by global demand.
Since all the producers that can choose their price set it to the same value, we obtain the
following equations for PH,t and P ∗H,t
P 1−θH,t = αP
1−θ
H,t−1 + (1− α)Pt(h)1−θ, (11)
P ∗1−θH,t = αP
∗1−θ
H,t−1 + (1− α)P∗t (h)1−θ.
Similar relations hold for the Foreign firms.
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2.3 Asset markets and exchange rate determination
In specifying the asset market structure, we restrict trade to one financial instrument only, a
safe nominal bond. While capturing the notion that international financial markets do not pro-
vide e¢cient risk insurance against all shocks, intertemporal trade still implies forward-looking
exchange rate determination, as a byproduct of equilibrium in financial markets. Namely, by
combining the Euler equations for the Home households
UC
/
Ct, ζC,t
0
Pt
= (1 + it)Et
"
β
UC
/
Ct+1, ζC,t+1
0
Pt+1
#
and the Foreign households:
UC
/
C∗t , ζ
∗
C,t
0
P∗t
= (1 + i∗t )Et
"
β
UC
/
C∗t+1, ζ
∗
C,t+1
0
P∗t+1
#
,
UC
/
C∗t , ζ
∗
C,t
0
EtP∗t
= (1 + it)Et
"
β
UC
/
C∗t+1, ζ
∗
C,t+1
0
Et+1P∗t+1
#
;
e¢cient trade in the international bond will imply the following uncovered interest parity con-
dition, which equates the nominal stochastic discount rates in expectations:
Et
"
β
UC
/
Ct+1, ζC,t+1
0
UC
/
Ct, ζC,t
0 Pt
Pt+1
#
= Et
"
β
UC
/
C∗t+1, ζ
∗
C,t+1
0
UC
/
C∗t , ζ
∗
C,t
0 EtP∗tEt+1P∗t+1
#
(12)
Solved forward, this equation pins down the equilibrium exchange rate.
Under complete markets, the condition (12) holds state-by-state, rather than in expectations,
since agents trade in contingent assets up to the point when, at the margin, the valuation of an
extra unit of currency is equalized across borders. When countries are symmetric, this implies
that the relative utility value of wealth, denoted by Wt,
Wt ≡
UC
/
C∗t , ζ
∗
C,t
0
1
EtP∗t
UC
/
Ct, ζC,t
0
1
Pt
=
UC
/
C∗t , ζ
∗
C,t
0
UC
/
Ct, ζC,t
0 1Qt (13)
is identically equal to one (see, e.g., Gravelle and Rees [1992], Backus and Smith [1993] and
Obstfeld and Rogo§ [2001]). Note that the marginal utility of consumption across borders is
adjusted for the respective prices of the consumption basket.
Under incomplete markets, however, the equilibrium condition (12) only holds in expecta-
tions: any shocks will induce a wedge in the (ex post) relative value of wealth across borders,
so that in general Wt 6= 1. As shown below, Wt defines a theoretically grounded and e¢cient
measure to account for asset markets imperfections in the policy problem–in line with the
approach by Woodford [2010], who studies monetary trade-o§s under financial frictions in a
closed economy setting.
2.4 Log-linearized equilibrium
Throughout the paper, the model’s equilibrium conditions and constraints will be written out in
log-deviations from the non-stochastic steady state–we will assume a symmetric steady-state
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in which the net foreign asset position is zero and the markup distortion is eliminated, with
appropriate subsidies. Details on the log-linearized model equations are given in appendix.
Notation-wise: denoting with upper-bar steady-state values, bxt = lnxt/x will represent
deviations under sticky prices. In general, we will not denote the same variable di§erently across
alternative specifications of the model–PCP vs. LCP, unitary trade elasticity vs. generic trade
elasticity–as each model will be discussed in a distinct section or subsection. We make two
exceptions to this rule. First, we will use the superscript fb to denote variables in the unique
“first-best” allocation, corresponding to the case of complete asset markets, flexible prices and
no markup distortions. Second, in Sections 4 and 5, we will use the superscript na to denote
variables in the “natural” (flex-price) allocation when the trade elasticity is set to one or left
unconstrained.
Before proceeding, it is useful to single out two properties of the log-linearized equilibrium
in our bond economy. First, the uncovered interest parity condition (12) implies
EtcWt+1 = cWt. (14)
Because of incomplete risk sharing, shocks will generally result in a unit root in the relative
value of wealth across borders–corresponding to a unit root in net foreign assets. While we will
carry out our analysis using a specification of the model in which cWt (and net foreign wealth) is
not stationary, in the appendix we show that nonstationarity does not play any substantive role
in our result. Second, under a symmetric steady state with zero net foreign wealth, up to first
order, net foreign assets (and thus cWt) do not respond to the ex post returns on internationally
traded assets. In other words, real net foreign assets are capitalized at the steady-state real
interest rate β−1. This feature has important implications for optimal monetary policy; namely,
starting from a symmetric steady state with zero net foreign wealth, monetary policy cannot
correct misallocations in demand and misalignment by manipulating the ex post return on
existing assets to a§ect the wealth distribution (as in, e.g., Devereux and Sutherland [2008] and
Benigno [2009]). Instead, it will operate via relative prices, output allocation and net foreign
assets accumulation.
3 Monetary policy trade-o§s in open economies with incom-
plete markets
Our main objective is to examine the monetary policy trade-o§s brought about by ine¢cient
capital flows in economies where asset markets are incomplete. In this section, we first define
and discuss the welfare-relevant gaps shaping policy trade-o§s in open economies. We then
derive a general quadratic policy loss function obtained from a second-order approximation
of agents’ utility for generic incomplete markets (i.e., without specifying the form of market
incompleteness). Finally, we characterize the optimal cooperative policy under commitment, in
terms of optimal targeting rules. To complete our analysis of monetary policy under incomplete
markets, in an appendix we also reconsider how imperfect risk sharing a§ects the monetary
transmission to macroeconomic variables.
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3.1 Welfare-relevant gaps in an open economy
As is customary in monetary stabilization analysis, we will write policy objectives and targeting
rules in terms of welfare-relevant gaps (all denoted with a tilde), expressing relevant variables
as deviations from their first-best allocation values.
3.1.1 The first-best allocation benchmark
Under the assumption that real net foreign assets are zero in steady state (B = 0), the first-
best allocation can be characterized as follows. The first-best output in the Home and Foreign
country, bY fbH,t and bY fbF,t, are, respectively:
bY fbH,t = 2aH(1−aH)(σφ−1)
!bT fbt #−(1−aH)!bζC,t−bζ∗C,t#+bζC,t+(1+η)bζY,t
η+σ (15)
bY fbF,t = 2aH(1−aH)(σφ−1)
!
−bT fbt #+(1−aH)!bζC,t−bζ∗C,t#+bζ∗C,t+(1+η)bζ∗Y,t
η+σ .
The terms of trade and the real exchange rate are:
bT fbt = σ
5bY fbH,t − bY fbF,t6− (2aH − 1)5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6
4 (1− aH) aH (σφ− 1) + 1 , (16)bQfbt = (2aH − 1) bT fbt = σ 5 bCfbt − bC∗fbt 6 .
The cross-border financial flows, characterized up to first order, are:
bBfbt − β−1 bBfbt−1 = (1− aH)σ−1 h(2aH (σφ− 1) + 1− σ) bT fbt − 5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6i (17)
where, with slight abuse of notation, bBfbt refers to “notional” real net foreign assets in the first
best, and real net foreign assets, Bt = BH,t+1Pt , are scaled with steady-state output, so thatbBfbt ' Bfbt − B
Y
fb
.
For the purpose of our analysis, the key property of the first-best allocation is that financial
and trade flows, as well as relative prices, only respond to shocks a§ecting contemporaneous (not
future, anticipated) productivity and preferences.14 A notable implication is that neither the
short-term real interest rate (given by the growth rates in marginal utility), nor the long-term
interest rate (equal to current consumption) moves in response to anticipated shocks.
3.1.2 Misalignment: real exchange rate gaps
A recurrent theme in policy debates concerns the possibility that international relative prices
are misaligned and cross-border borrowing/lending is too high or too low–corresponding to
either excessive or insu¢cient demand in di§erent countries. Drawing on previous work of ours
(Corsetti et al. [2010]), we now define gaps to account for these policy concerns, using the same
logic underlying the definition of the welfare-relevant output gap.
14This is so because the model economy abstracts from capital accumulation and other sources of sluggish
adjustment, such has habits or adjustment costs. Introducing these features would change the results to follow
mainly quantitatively.
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Exchange rates are misaligned when they deviate from the value they would take in the
e¢cient allocation.15 Since there are di§erent measures of international relative prices, there
are di§erent (complementary) measures of misalignment. For the relative price of consumption
across countries, the welfare-relevant gap is ]RERt:
]RERt = eQt = bQt − bQfbt . (18)
Analogously, for the relative price of tradables, the terms-of-trade gap is ]TOT t:
]TOT t = eTt = bTt − bT fbt . (19)
Finally, misalignments can also occur when nominal rigidities in local currency translates into
cross-border deviations from the law of one price (henceforth LOOP). In this case, identical
goods are ine¢ciently traded at di§erent prices at Home and abroad. These price di§erences
define another dimension of misalignment, which, measured on average for the basket of Home
goods, is: e∆H,t = (bEt + bP ∗H,t − bPH,t) (20)
where e∆H,t is equal to zero when the LOOP holds. Note that, to the extent that P ∗H,t and PH,t
are sticky, the law of one price is violated with any movement in the exchange rate. Specifically,
domestic currency depreciation tends to increase the Home firms’ receipts in Home currency
from selling goods abroad, relative to the Home market: Home currency depreciation raisese∆H,t. Similar considerations apply to e∆F,t.
3.1.3 Demand misallocation and the wealth gap
Ine¢cient external positions could be captured by tracing capital flows in excess of the financial
flows in an e¢cient allocation, i.e., bBt− bBfbt .16 However, there is a better, more direct measure of
policy-relevant distortions associated with cross-border misallocations. This is the “relative de-
mand gap,” denoted by eDt, and defined as the cross-country di§erence in private (consumption)
demand relative to the first best: eDt =fCt − eC∗t .
One key advantage of eDt is that, combined with the real exchange rate gap, eQt, it adds up to
the “wealth” gap, fWt, defined as follows:
fWt = σ eDt − eQt, (21)
15We stress that, conceptually, the first-best exchange rate is not necessarily (and in general will not be)
identical to the “equilibrium exchange rate,” traditionally studied by international and public institutions, as
a guide to policy-making. “Equilibrium exchange rates” typically refer to some notion of long-term external
balance, against which to assess short-run movements in currency values possibly reflecting nominal rigidities
and all kinds of real and financial frictions. On the contrary, the e¢cient exchange rate is theoretically and
conceptually defined, at any time horizon, in relation to a hypothetical economy in which all prices are flexible
and markets are complete. In fact, our measure of misalignment (as the di§erence between current exchange
rates and the e¢cient one) is constructed, in strict analogy to the notion of a welfare-relevant output gap, as the
di§erence between current output and the e¢cient level of output, which does not coincide with the natural rate
(i.e., the level of output with flexible prices).
16 It is worth stressing that this measure would be well defined also under financial autarky, whereas bBt = 0.
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where fWt is equal to log-deviations in the relative value of wealth (13). If markets are complete,fWt = 0 always, even when the overall allocation is not e¢cient because of nominal rigidities or
other distortions. If markets are incomplete, instead, fWt will generally not be zero, and can have
either sign, with a straightforward interpretation. A positive gap fWt > 0 means that, given the
relative price of consumption, the consumption of the Home (national representative) individual
is ine¢ciently high vis-à-vis foreign consumption. While consumption smoothing is optimal
from an individual-agent perspective in response to anticipated shocks, from a global welfare
perspective relative Home wealth would be too high.17 Conversely, a negative gap suggests that
relative Home demand is ine¢ciently low given the exchange rate, and/or, for a given eDt, the
shock causes ine¢cient real depreciation (relative to first best).
3.2 Why and how do incomplete markets a§ect monetary policy?
The wealth gap defined in the previous subsection fully captures the implications of imper-
fect financial markets for the policy trade-o§s faced by policy-makers in the design of optimal
stabilization rules. Under complete markets, fWt = σ eDt − eQt = 0. The demand gap eDt and
real exchange rate misalignment eQt can each be di§erent from zero–depending on the e§ect
of nominal rigidities or other distortions (e.g., taxes or markup shocks). Yet, as a consequences
of perfect risk sharing, they will always remain proportional to each other: closing eQt will be
tantamount to closing eDt, and vice versa. Under incomplete markets, instead, since fWt will
generally deviate from zero, eDt and eQt are no longer proportional to each other. In general,
the optimal monetary rule will not close any of these gaps completely, but will have to trade o§
minimizing these gaps with inflation and output gaps.
In some notable cases (which we analyze in detail in Section 4), capital flows and the corre-
sponding wealth gap fWt will be exogenous to policy: this means that the monetary authorities
will not be able to a§ect the combined ine¢ciencies arising from both the misallocation in de-
mand and the real exchange rate misalignment. As shown in the appendix, under both LCP
and PCP, when fWt is exogenous, monetary policy a§ects the demand gap and misalignment
in the same direction. Namely, a Home monetary tightening (easing) narrows (widens) the
former while making the real exchange more overvalued (undervalued). Yet, as we show in
Section 4, monetary policy will still be able to determine in a constrained-e¢cient way how to
spread the welfare costs of macroeconomic adjustment across the di§erent gaps, including the
two components of fWt.
When instead monetary policy impacts capital flows and fWt, the e§ect of a Home monetary
tightening depends on structural features such as risk aversion σ , the trade elasticity φ, the
degree of openness and price rigidities. As shown in the appendix, under PCP, a contractionary
monetary policy always increases capital inflows but narrows fWt for φ > 1+ 2aH−1σ2aH ; the opposite
occurs – i.e., capital inflows fall and fWt increases after a tightening – for φ < 1+ 2aH−1σ2aH − 1.
Under LCP, a contractionary monetary policy always increases capital inflows but narrows fWt
17With incomplete markets, price movements are not e¢cient. An appreciation of the real exchange rate as-
sociated with a Home consumption boom is a leading example of a pecuniary externality. While fully rational
from an individual perspective, agents’s decisions to borrow and lend move international relative prices ine¢-
ciently. These are no longer correct indicators of relative scarcity: consumption is higher where the price of the
consumption bundle is also higher; see Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1986].
14
for σ > 1 and φ > 1; the opposite occurs for σ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ < 1 − 2aH−1+
2(1−aH)
σ
2aH
ν2−1
1−ν1
< 1.18 We
analyze the optimal monetary policy response to capital flows in this case in Section 5.
The wealth gap fWt a§ects all gaps in the economy. It first enters relative price misalignments
as follows
eTt + e∆t = σ
5eYH,t − eYF,t6− (2aH − 1)5fWt + e∆t6
4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1 , (22)eQt = (2aH − 1)5eTt + e∆t6+ e∆t
where we used the fact that, under symmetry, e∆H,t = e∆F,t = e∆t (see Engel [2011]). Note
that, while eQt and eTt are a function of each other, they can move di§erently in response to
shocks because of home bias in preferences and deviations from the law of one price. Taking
the di§erence in budget constraints, we obtain:
σ eDt = σ h−2β−1 5 eBt − β eBt−16+ eYH,t − eYF,ti− 2 (1− aH)σ eTt (23)
+(1− aH) [4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1)− 1]σ−1
h
(2aH (σφ− 1) + 1− σ) eT fbt − 5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6i .
Everything else equal, capital inflows ( eBt < 0) cause the demand gap to turn positive, eDt > 0.
The wealth gap a§ects inflation dynamics, directly and indirectly (via relative price mis-
alignment). The Phillips Curves in our model (four under LCP, collapsing into two under PCP)
are written below:
πH,t − βEtπH,t+1 =
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
"
(σ + η) eYH,t + bµt+
− (1− aH)
h
2aH (σφ− 1)
5eTt + e∆t6− e∆t − fWti
#
π∗H,t − βEtπ∗H,t+1 = πH,t − βEtπH,t+1 +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
b∆t,
π∗F,t − βEtπ∗F,t+1 =
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
"
(σ + η) eYF,t + bµ∗t+
(1− aH)
h
2aH (σφ− 1)
5eTt + e∆t6− e∆t − fWti
#
πF,t − βEtπF,t+1 = π∗F,t − βEtπ∗F,t+1 −
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
e∆t,
where bµt and bµ∗t denote markup shocks. As emphasized by CDL [2010], these expressions
make it apparent that the wealth gap, as well as price misalignments, are akin to ine¢cient
(but exogenous) markup shocks. Indeed, when markets are incomplete, the distinction between
“e¢cient” and “ine¢cient” shocks becomes less useful for the purpose of policy design. Also,
shocks to tastes and technology endogenously open a wealth gap and create misalignments–and
thus raise meaningful policy trade-o§s between output and inflation under both LCP and PCP.
18See Section 4 for a definition of ν1 and ν2, which are functions of the degree of price rigidities α.
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3.3 A general (quadratic) global policy loss function
From the model, we derive a second-order approximation of the equally weighted sum of the
utility of the Home and Foreign national representative agents–written in terms of the gaps
defined above, all in quadratic forms. The policy loss functions include not only “internal”
objectives (inflation and output gaps), but also “external” ones (relative price misalignments
and the relative demand gap).
Specifically, under the assumption of appropriate subsidies o§setting firms’ markup to deliver
an e¢cient, non-distorted steady state, the period-by-period quadratic welfare function for
incomplete market economies is as follows:
LWt −
/LWt 0fb n (24)
−1
2
8><>:
(σ + η)
5eY 2H,t + eY 2F,t6+ α(1− αβ) (1− α)θ /π2t + π∗2t 0
− 2aH (1− aH)
4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1
!
(σφ− 1)σ
5eYH,t − eYF,t62 − φ5e∆t + fWt62#
9>=>;
+t.i.p.,
where for convenience we have substituted out terms-of-trade misalignments using their equilib-
rium relation with output gaps, deviations from the law of one price, and relative demand gaps.
While this loss function is written for an LCP economy, its PCP counterpart can be readily
obtained by setting the LOOP deviations to zero (e∆t = 0), and using the fact that, under the
law of one price, the inflation term π2t ≡ aHπ2H,t+(1− aH)π2F,t and π∗2t ≡ aHπ∗2F,t+(1− aH)π∗2H,t
reduces to π2t ≡ π2H,t and π∗2t ≡ π∗2F,t. It can be shown that expression (24) encompasses the
cases of financial autarky (no asset is traded internationally), international trade in one bond,
as well as international trade in any number of assets, including complete markets.19 In this
sense, the above function generalizes and complements the ones derived in previous work of
ours (CDL [2010]) for the case of autarky and complete markets.20
3.4 Optimal targeting rules in bond economies
To characterize the optimal cooperative policy under commitment, we maximize the present
discounted value of the sum of (24) over time, subject to the log-linearized equilibrium conditions
and constraints characterizing the competitive equilibrium allocation in bond economies. In the
interest of transparency and tractability, we adopt a timeless perspective (see, e.g., Woodford
[2010]), and focus on the (widely studied) case of economies whereas non-contingent bonds are
the only assets traded across borders. The derivation is in the appendix.
Following a standard practice in international economics, the optimal cooperative policy
can be written in terms of two targeting rules: a global rule summing up inflation and output
gaps across countries, and a cross-country rule, expressed in terms of di§erences in gaps across
19With fWt = 0, and φ = 1, our loss function is comparable to the corresponding expressions in Engel [2009],
who carries out the analysis under the assumption of complete markets and focuses on the case of a unitary
elasticity.
20Gaps (other than output gaps and inflation) similar to the ones we use in our analysis identify policy objectives
arising from heterogeneity among sectors and agents in economies distorted by financial imperfections, in addition
to nominal rigidities (see, e.g., Curdia and Woodford [2009] for an analysis in a closed economy).
16
countries. From a global perspective, the optimal targeting rule is
0 =
5eYH,t − eYH,t−16+ 5eYF,t − eYF,t−16+
θ
)
aHπH,t + (1− aH)πF,t + aHπ∗F,t + (1− aH)π∗H,t
*
;
where in the case of a PCP economy the inflation term becomes πH,t + π∗F,t – as noted above
under PCP, world CPI and PPI inflation rates coincide. From a global perspective, the optimal
cooperative monetary policy stabilizes output gaps and inflation at the global level. To the
extent that world inflation is zero (in the absence of exogenous markup shocks), the sum of
output gaps and consumption deviations is also zero. An important implication is that the
optimal monetary stance will have the opposite sign across countries. Another implication is
that we can write: fWt ≡ 2σ eCt − eQt.
These results also hold in the natural rate allocation.
In contrast, deriving cross-country or country-specific rules involves solving a system of
di§erence equations in the di§erent Lagrange multipliers from the optimal policy problem,
making it possible to obtain tractable general expressions–comparable to the global rule–only
under some parameter restrictions. We will analyze the LCP and PCP economies in turn.
3.4.1 Low pass-through (LCP) economies
In the LCP case, a tractable rule is derived by Engel [2011] under the assumptions that markets
are complete and η = 0 (infinite labor elasticity). A first important result in our paper is that,
as long as labor elasticity is infinite, it is possible to derive a tractable cross-country targeting
rule also under incomplete markets. This is given by the following expression:
0 = θ (πt − π∗t ) + eDt − eDt−1 (25)
+
4aH (1− aH)φ
2aH (φ− 1) + 1
(σ − 1)
σ
h5fWt − fWt−16+ 5e∆t − e∆t−16i .
Without the last term on the right-hand side, this expression defines the targeting rule under
complete markets, where the cross-country targeting criterion involves only CPI inflation and
consumption di§erentials. The last term, in the wealth gap and deviations from the law of one
price, is specific to incomplete markets economies.
Under perfect risk sharing, Engel [2011] derives the important result that, as long as η = 0,
the relative prices eTt + e∆t are exogenous with respect to monetary policy–for any value of σ.
In the appendix, we establish that the same result also holds under incomplete markets, if we
restrict agents to have log-utility, i.e., σ = 1. Thus, we are able to show that, in LCP economies
with η = 0 and σ = 1, monetary policy cannot a§ect eTt+ e∆t–and since in this case cross-border
capital flows are solely a function of eTt + e∆t, they are independent of monetary policy for any
value of the trade elasticity. This will have notable implications for the analysis in the sections
to follow.
Observe that the last term on the right-hand side of the optimal rule (25) drops out when
σ = 1: the expression for the cross-country rule (25) is the same under both complete and
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incomplete markets. However, it does not follow that monetary policy is the same in the two
cases. To illustrate the di§erence, we combine the above expression with the definition of fWt
to rewrite the optimal (cooperative) policy in the form of a country-specific rule for the Home
economy (and a symmetric one for Foreign country). Abstracting from markup shocks, this
reads:
0 = θπt + 1/2 ·
h5fWt − fWt−16+ 5 eQt − eQt−16i
= θπt +
5 eCt − eCt−16 .
When markets are complete (fWt = 0), the above reduces to the expression derived by Engel
[2011]: with perfect risk insurance, provided that shocks are “e¢cient” (i.e., they a§ect tastes
and/or technology only, while bµt = bµ∗t = 0), the optimal policy sets CPI inflation rates to
zero. A zero inflation policy closes the consumption gap and eliminates real exchange rate
misalignments at once–reflecting the fact that these gaps are proportional to (exogenous)
relative prices eTt + e∆t. This is not possible when markets are incomplete (fWt 6= 0).
It may be worth stressing that under LCP closing the real exchange rate gap (i.e., settingeQt = 0) does not necessarily eliminate deviations from the law of one price–nor prevent
ine¢cient deviations from the law of one price e∆t from mapping into output gap fluctuations.
This is apparent from the following expression:
eQt = (2aH − 1)5eTt + e∆t6+ e∆t = (2aH − 1) σ
5eYF,t − eYF,t6− (2aH − 1)5fWt + e∆t6
4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1 +
e∆t.
Because of nominal distortions in import and export pricing in local currency, the optimal policy
allocation cannot be first best, whether or not risk sharing is perfect.
3.4.2 High pass-through (PCP) economies
The analytics of the cross-country targeting rule under PCP stands in sharp contrast to the
LCP case above. No parameter restriction is required to derive a compact expression for the
following cross-country targeting rule in a bond economy:
0 = Et
5eYH,t+1 − eYH,t6− Et 5eYF,t+1 − eYF,t6+ θ /EtπH,t+1 − Etπ∗F,t+10 . (26)
Notably, this bond-economy optimal rule is a “forward-looking version” of the cross-country
targeting rule under complete markets (see Engel [2011] and CDL [2010]), shown hereafter as:
0 =
5eYH,t − eYH,t−16− 5eYF,t − eYF,t−16+ θ /πH,t − π∗F,t0 . (27)
Comparing the two: in a bond economy, policy-makers optimally trade o§ di§erences in output
gap growth with inflation di§erentials in expectations, rather than state-by-state.
Combining once again the global and cross-country rules for bond economies, and abstracting
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from markup shocks, we can write a country-specific (cooperative) rule for the Home economy:21
0 =
heYH,t − eYH,t−1 + θπH,ti+ 2aH(1−aH)φσ+η(4aH(1−aH)(σφ−1)+1) 2aH(σφ−1)+1−σ2aH(φ−1)+1 5fWt − fWt−16 .
Note that, if either markets are complete (fWt = 0) or σ = φ = 1, the above expression becomes
a function of purely domestic objectives:
eYH,t − eYH,t−1 + θπH,t = 0. (28)
Each country would stabilize its own output gap and GDP-deflator inflation–a result that
identifies an important case of “isomorphism” of optimal policy in closed and open economies.
To gain insight on how incomplete markets impinge on key policy trade-o§s under PCP, we
subtract the two Phillips Curves from each other using the equilibrium expression for the terms
of trade:
πH,t − π∗F,t = β
/
EtπH,t+1 − Etπ∗F,t+1
0
+
(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
(η + σ)
5eYH,t − eYF,t6+ bµt − bµ∗t
−2 (1− aH) ·
266642aH (σφ− 1) σ
5eYH,t − eYF,t6− (2aH − 1)fWt
4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1| {z }eTt
− fWt
37775
9>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>;
.
Under complete markets (fWt = 0), the terms-of-trade gap actually becomes strictly propor-
tional to the di§erences in output gaps. It is then easy to verify that, consistent with the
cross-country targeting rule (28), monetary authorities face no significant trade-o§ between
inflation and output gap stabilization, except in the presence of exogenous markup shocks bµt
or bµ∗t . In other words, as long as (current and anticipated) shocks a§ect both output and its
first-best counterpart, the optimal policy consists of keeping national output gaps closed and
inflation exactly equal to zero. Under complete markets and PCP, this is indeed the optimal
response to (“e¢cient”) shocks to productivity and preferences.
In the presence of financial imperfections, however, the terms-of-trade gap and output gaps
are not proportional to each other. Any shock, including e¢cient shocks to tastes and tech-
nology, results in a wealth gap fWt 6= 0, forcing monetary authorities to trade o§ inflation and
output gaps. This is true also when σ = φ = 1, in which case the targeting rules are formally
identical across complete and incomplete markets, yet domestic welfare-relevant output gaps do
not behave identically.
21Under financial autarky, the cross-country rule already derived in Corsetti et al. (2010) can be written as
follows:
0 = [σ + η (4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1)]
nheYH,t − eYH,t−1i− heYF,t − eYF,t−1i+ θ 'πH,t − π∗F,t(o+
4aH (1− aH)φ2aH (σφ− 1) + 1− σ
2aH (φ− 1) + 1
*cWt − cWt−1,+
2 (1− aH)
-
2aH (σφ− 1)σ − (σ − 1) 4aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) + 1
2aH (φ− 1) + 1
.
θ
'
πH,t − π∗F,t
(
.
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4 Optimal trade-o§s varying exchange rate pass-through
In this and the next section, we bring our analysis to bear on the optimal conduct of mone-
tary policy in economies that experience ine¢cient capital flows and study the macroeconomic
dynamics that result from the implementation of the optimal targeting rules. Throughout
our analysis, we will specifically focus on shocks in the form of “news,” indicating anticipated
changes in preference parameters. As emphasized by Devereux and Engel [2006, 2009], an im-
portant reason for analyzing “news shocks” is that they highlight the forward-looking nature of
exchange rate determination. From our perspective, a key additional reason is that, as shown in
subsection 3.1.1, in the first-best allocation the current values of macro variables do not respond
at all to news foreshadowing changes in fundamentals in the future: the response of “gaps” (in
anticipation of future changes in technology and preferences) thus coincides with the response
in the equilibrium allocation until the anticipated shock materializes–with obvious gains in
tractability and analytical transparency.
For expositional clarity, in this section we focus our analysis on a bond economy with a
unitary trade elasticity, log-consumption utility and linear disutility of labor–a specification
we dub a “Cole and Obstfeld” or CO economy. In the next section, we generalize our results to
the case of non-unitary trade elasticity. The key advantage of beginning our study by assuming
a unitary elasticity is that, in this case, news shocks generate capital flows that are exogenous
to policy and macroeconomic adjustments and are thus identical under both LCP and PCP.
Thanks to this property, we can compare optimal monetary policy across di§erent economic
and policy environments, holding these flows (and thus the underlying shocks) constant.
4.1 A “Cole and Obstfeld” economy with capital flows exogenous to policy
As is well known since Cole and Obstfeld [1991] and subsequent work, in an environment
with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of domestic and imported goods (φ = 1), log consumption
utility (σ = 1) and symmetric home bias, productivity risk is e¢ciently shared via endogenous
terms-of-trade movements, regardless of whether financial markets are complete or incomplete.
However, full risk sharing is not granted in the presence of other sources of risk directly a§ecting
net foreign assets, ranging from political risk (i.e., anticipation of capital controls; see, e.g.,
Acharya and Bengui [2015]), to financial shocks (see, e.g., Gabaix and Maggiori [2015] and
Cavallino [2016]), and/or preference shocks impinging on savings. As many of these shocks
have broadly similar analytical representations, there is little or no loss of generality in focusing
on shocks to preferences that a§ect the intertemporal valuation of consumption, thus resulting
in a motive to save and lend across borders, and generating cross-country capital flows.
Furthermore, throughout the analysis we will posit a linear disutility of labor, η = 0, as this
last restriction is necessary for tractability in the LCP economies. We start by discussing the
first-best and competitive allocations, then turn to the optimal policy.
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4.1.1 Cross-border (notional) flows in the first-best allocation
As we have already shown, in the first-best allocation, no macro variable (but the long-term
interest rate) responds to news shocks. With σ = φ = 1, (17) simplifies to
bBfbt − β−1 bBfbt−1 = − (1− aH)5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6 .
A surge of (e¢cient) financial inflows ( bBfbt < 0) can only be driven by contemporaneous relative
preference shocks in the Home country (bζC,t−bζ∗C,t > 0). In Table 1, we write the corresponding
allocation. Note that in this table we do not yet impose η = 0, as a way to gain insight into
the implications of such assumption.
Table 1. The first-best allocation in the CO economy
bY fbH,t = 11 + η haHbζC,t + (1− aH)bζ∗C,tibY fbF,t = 11 + η h(1− aH)bζC,t + aHbζ∗C,tibQfbt = (2aH − 1) bT fbt = − η1 + η (2aH − 1)2 5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6bDfbt = 5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6− bQfbt
If η > 0, provided consumption preferences are biased towards Home goods (2aH > 1), capital
inflows from Home preference shocks in favor of current consumption would result in a Home
currency real appreciation ( bQfbt < 0). But with a linear disutility of labor, η = 0, the first-best
real exchange rate remains constant ( bQfbt = 0). The only e§ect of the shock is to raise output in
both countries, in proportion to the consumption Home bias. Given that the exchange rate is
unresponsive, the consumption di§erential rises e¢ciently, one-to-one with the contemporaneous
relative preference shock: bDfbt = 5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6 .
4.1.2 Financial flows in bond economies
In contrast to the first-best allocation, when the only traded assets are non-contingent bonds,
financial flows respond not only to contemporaneous fundamentals, but also to expectations of
future fundamentals:
bBt = bBt−1 + (1− aH)β 1X
j=0
βjEt
h5bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j6− 5bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j6i . (29)
An anticipated future fall in the relative degree of impatience
5bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j < 06 causes
capital to flow into the Home country–recall that a negative bBt denotes inflows into the Home
country. These flows are ine¢cient : while trade in bonds is welfare maximizing from an individ-
ual household’s perspective (at Home and abroad), the entire capital account deficit is excessive
relative to the first-best allocation–since in response to anticipated shocks no (notional) capital
would flow across borders on impact under perfect risk sharing and flexible prices (i.e., bBfbt = 0).
Note that the size of the ine¢cient inflows is increasing in openness (decreasing in home bias
aH).
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Ine¢cient capital flows open a wealth gap:
(1− aH)fWt = −5 bBt − β−1 bBt−16− (1− aH)5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6 . (30)
Two key results can be derived from the expressions above. First, as in the CO economy, bothbBt, and fWt are a function of the exogenous preference shocks only, and therefore independent
of nominal rigidities and monetary policy regimes. Second, a capital inflow ( bBt < 0) driven by
news shocks will invariably lead to a positive wealth gap. From a global welfare perspective, as
the Home economy accommodates a higher desire to save among Foreign residents, the relative
Home demand eDt grows excessive, and/or the real exchange rate becomes misaligned.
Observe nonetheless that the wealth gap is not necessarily positive in the presence of capital
inflows. The above expression suggests that, even if bBt < 0, fWt can be negative in response
to contemporaneous (as opposed to “news”) taste shocks, raising the utility of current Home
consumption (and associated with a relative increase in e¢cient output, bY fbH,t − bY fbF,t > 0).22 In
this case, although capital flows into the Home country, domestic consumption is ine¢ciently
low relative to the foreign one. The implications for optimal monetary policy will be discussed
in detail in the next section.
4.1.3 The natural rate allocation with news shocks
With imperfect insurance, ine¢cient capital flows result in misallocation independent of price
stickiness. This is apparent from inspecting the flexible price or natural rate allocation in
response to news shocks, shown in Table 2. In the table, all variables are expressed as deviations
from the e¢cient allocations–defining gaps denoted with a superscript “na”–, and, sincebQfbt = 0, eQnat = bQt.
Table 2. The natural rate allocation in the CO economyeY naH,t = −eY naF,t = − (1− aH)fWteQnat = − (2aH − 1)fWteT nat = −fWteDnat = 2 (1− aH)fWteCnat = − eC∗nat = 12 eDnat = (1− aH)fWt
In the natural rate allocation of our CO economies, output gaps, exchange rate misalign-
ment and relative demand gap are all proportional to the (exogenous) gap fWt in response to
news shocks. When fWt > 0, capital inflows result in a negative welfare-relevant output gap,
an overvalued real exchange rate and an excessive level of domestic consumption, both in ab-
solute terms and relative to Foreigners. Since news shocks bring about purely redistributive
ine¢ciencies, the Foreign economy just mirrors the Home responses.
In response to news shocks, all gaps jump on impact, reflecting the wealth gap opened
by the news. Afterwards, since EtcWt+1 = cWt, they remain constant until the change in the
22By using (29), you can also write this expression as (1− aH)EtcWt+s =
− (1− aH)
26664
*bζC,t − bζ∗C,t,+
β
P1
j=0 β
jEt
24 *bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j,+
−
*bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j,
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37775+ 1−ββ bBt−1.
22
fundamentals materializes.23 Note that, in the intervening period between the news and future
changes in fundamentals, the short-term natural rate of interest (equal to the growth rate of
consumption under flexible prices) is not a§ected at all by the news shocks.24
It can be shown that, in our CO economies, the natural allocation in Table 2 above not only
coincides with PPI price stability under PCP (this is a well known result), but also with CPI
price stability under LCP (but for relative prices
5eTt + e∆t6 and the output gap). This result
will be quite useful in the policy analysis to follow.
4.2 Domestic demand stabilization with low pass-through (LCP economies)
For given ine¢cient capital flows (29) and the associated wealth gap (30)) in response to news
shocks, Table 3 shows the constrained-e¢cient allocation under LCP, when monetary authorities
implement the optimal targeting rules, rewritten below for convenience:
θπt +
1
2
5 eQt − eQt−16 = −1
2
5fWt − fWt−16 ,
Table 3: Constrained-e¢cient allocation under LCP with news shockseYH,t = 2aH (1− aH)5eTt + e∆t6+ 1/2 · (2aH − 1) eDt
πt = − 12θ2 (1− aH)
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
fWt − (β{2 − 1)
β{2
fWt−1 + (1− {1) eQt−1
eTt + e∆t = ν1 5eTt−1 + e∆t−16− (βν2 − 1)
βν2
fWt
eQt = − (2aH − 1) (β{2 − 1)
β{2
fWt − 1
β{2
5fWt − fWt−16+ {1 eQt−1eDt = 2 (1− aH) (β{2−1)β{2 fWt + 1β{2fWt−1 + {1 eQt−1
In the table, the variables {1, ν1 and {2, ν2 represent eigenvalues–where ν1,2 di§ers from
{1,2 only in that they does not depend on θ.25 For future reference, it is worth noting that
23When fundamentals change in the future, of course, macroeconomic variables will change again, including
both actual bCnat+s and e¢cient consumption bCfbt+s, but not bQnat .
24 It follows that a monetary policy framework equating the policy rate to the short-term natural rate would
be initially unresponsive to the capital inflows.
25Namely for {1,2:
{1,2 =
1 + β +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
θ ±
s-
1 + β +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
θ
.2
− 4β
2β
and ν1,2 di§er from the above only in that the term
(1− αβ) (1− α)
α
is not multiplied by θ. It is worth noting
that the eigenvalues {2 and ν2 determine the discounted weight attributed to expectations of future fundamentals
in driving the dynamics of the real exchange rate and of relative prices eTt + b∆t. Note that the higher the degree
of price stickiness α, the larger the stable eigenvalues {1 and ν1, the lower the speed of adjustment of gaps
under the optimal policy. Correspondingly, the lower the unstable eigenvalues {2 and ν2, the less expected future
fundamentals are discounted in determining the gaps.
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these eigenvalues are related as follows
0 < {1 < 1 < β−1 +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
αβ
θ < {2,
0 < ν1 < 1 < β
−1 +
(1− αβ) (1− α)
αβ
< ν2,
ν2 < {2
so that 0 <
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
< 1, 0 <
(βν2 − 1)
βν2
< 1, and
(βν2 − 1)
βν2
<
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
.
Consider the world-economy response to news shocks at time t0, resulting in capital inflows
and a positive wedge gap fWt0 > 0. According to Table 3, implementing the targeting rules
leads to a fall in Home CPI inflation on impact, given by the following expression:
πt0 = − (1− aH)
(β{2 − 1)
2θβ{2
fWt0 ≤ 0. (31)
The (constrained-) optimal contractionary stance at Home does contain the ine¢cient surge in
Home consumption relative to the Foreign one. The relative demand gap is positive
eDt0 = 2 (1− aH) (β{2 − 1)β{2 fWt0 > 0 (32)
but smaller than under CPI price stability (compare with Table 2, whereas
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
< 1).
The Home real exchange rate correspondingly appreciates on impact:
eQt0 = − !(2aH − 1) (β{2 − 1)β{2 + 1β{2
# fWt0 < 0. (33)
by more than under price stability (since the expression in square brackets is greater than one).26
Recall that, since bQfbt = 0 in response to news shocks, the welfare relevant gap and the real
exchange rate move one-to-one: eQt = bQt.
Because the optimal stance is relatively contractionary at Home, the output gap is always
smaller than under CPI price stability.27 Yet, under the optimal policy, the welfare-relevant
26Observe that, dynamically, the optimal stance induces a predictable exchange rate dynamic, where Home
real appreciation is followed by depreciation. To illustrate this dynamic, one can use the expression for eQt in
Table 3 to decompose the movement of the exchange rate into a long-run permanent appreciation component
and a component driven by the expected cumulated real interest rate di§erential across countries. Comparing
the two, what determines this dynamic is the following inequality:
1
β{2
> (2aH − 1) (β{2 − 1)
β{2
{1
(1− {1) = (2aH − 1)
1
β{2
. (34)
The expected appreciation in the long run reflects the permanent wealth e§ects associated with the capital inflow
under incomplete markets.
27Namely: eY CPIH,t0 = − (1− aH) -1− 2aH71− (βν2 − 1)βν2
8. fWt0 ,
where now gaps under strict CPI stability are denoted with a CPI superscript.
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output gap is not necessarily negative on impact:
eYH,t0 = 2aH (1− aH)5eTt + e∆t6+ 1/2 · (2aH − 1) eDt
= − (1− aH)
!
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
− 2aH
-
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
− (βν2 − 1)
βν2
.# fWt0 Q 0,
Specifically, it is possible that the positive impact of the capital inflow on the relative demand
gap, eDt outweighs the negative e§ect of the terms-of-trade gap and deviations from the LOOP,eTt+ e∆t.28 It is easy to see that, on impact, the output gap is negative if the following condition
is satisfied:
β{2 − 1
β{2
βν2
− 1
> 2aH.
This condition is more likely to hold in economies that are very open (i.e., economies with a low
home bias aH)–intuitively, openness increases the relative weight of
5eTt + e∆t6 and decreases
that of eDt in the output gap expression above. Furthermore, the condition always holds (for
any degree of openness), in limit cases where prices are either very sticky ({2 ' ν2 ! 1/β) or
very flexible ({2 ' ν2 !1).
Together, these results show that, in our CO economies under LCP, the monetary authorities
optimally trade o§ stabilization of domestic demand with a larger real exchange rate gap. Using
our expressions, we can now dig deeper, and analyze how this trade-o§, i.e., the extent to which
monetary policy pursues one objective over the other, varies with the degree of nominal rigidities
(thus exchange rate pass-through) and openness.
Concerning nominal rigidities and pass-through, note that, for α! 0 (prices are flexible in
the limit),
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
! 1 and 1
β{2
! 0 : in absolute value, the coe¢cient of fWt+s declines in
(33), but rises in (32). For higher degrees of price flexibility,optimizing policymakers tolerate a
larger misallocation of demand, as they pay more attention to the ine¢cient real exchange rate
appreciation. This is quite intuitive: as import prices become less sticky, exchange rate pass-
through is higher. Competitiveness progressively becomes a stronger policy concern relative
to aggregate demand stabilization (the more flexible prices are, the closer {2 is to ν2, and the
smaller the output gap is in absolute value). Remarkably, as prices become less sticky, a milder
Home monetary contraction causes the equilibrium rate of inflation (31) to fall by more (since
with less nominal rigidities prices react more strongly).
Similar considerations apply to openness: as the economy becomes more open, i.e., for
aH ! 1/2 (the case of no home bias), the optimal policy pays more attention to real exchange
rate misalignment. Indeed, for any given degree of price stickiness, when the economy becomes
more open, a tight domestic monetary policy becomes progressively less e§ective in dealing with
a demand boom fueled by capital inflows.29
28Recall that since ν2 < {2, the expression in square brackets can have either sign.
29When cWt0 < 0–the case associated with an increase in the e¢cient level of current output–Home monetary
policy is relatively expansionary to stimulate the ine¢ciently low domestic consumption. Relative to the above,
the response of optimal monetary policy is the opposite, because capital inflows are now ine¢ciently low. The
real exchange rate depreciates and is undervalued. However, undervaluation is lower with a high degree of
pass-through and openness.
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4.3 Exchange rate stabilization and competitiveness with high pass-through
(PCP economies)
A comparison of our results across LCP and PCP economies is particularly suitable in our
Cole-and-Obstfeld specification, since in response to identical news shocks, the sign and size of
the ensuing capital flows and wealth gap–that is, the expressions for bBt and fWt in (30) and
(29)– are exactly the same. Conditional on a given bBt < 0 and the associated fWt > 0, Table
4 presents the allocation under the optimal cooperative monetary policy in the PCP economy.
Table 4: Constrained-e¢cient allocation under PCP with news shockseYH,t = {1 eYH,t−1 − (1− aH) (β{2 − 1)
β{2
fWt
θπH,t = −
5eYH,t − eYH,t−16eTt = −-1− 2 (1− aH)
β{2
. fWt + 2{1 eYH,t−1
eQt = (2aH − 1) !−-1− 2 (1− aH)
β{2
. fWt + 2{1 eYH,t−1#eDt = 2 (1− aH) h1 + (2aH−1)β{2 i fWt + 2 (2aH − 1){1 eYH,t−1
The Home optimal monetary response to the capital inflows is the opposite relative to the
LCP case: when exchange rate pass-through is complete, Home monetary authorities pursue a
monetary expansion. Compared with the natural rate allocation in Table 2, they tolerate some
short-run (GDP deflator) inflation:
πt0 = (1− aH)
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
fWt0 > 0
and lean on the appreciation of the real exchange rate
eQt0 = − (2aH − 1)-1− 2 (1− aH)β{2
. fWt0 < 0.
so as to contain competitiveness losses. Relative to the allocation in Table 2, the expansionary
stance mitigates the negative output gap
eYH,t0 = − (1− aH) (β{2 − 1)β{2 fWt0 < 0,
(this is so because
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
< 1), at the cost of increasing the relative demand gap
eDt0 = 2 (1− aH) !1 + (2aH − 1)β{2
# fWt0 > 0.
The optimal degree of monetary expansion again depends on whether the economy is more or
less open, and the degree of price stickiness.
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4.4 Exchange rate volatility, inflation and output gaps in CO economies:
LCP vs PCP
For our CO economies, the macroeconomic response to shocks under the optimal policy is
illustrated by Figure 1. The figure plots the impulse responses of the relevant gaps to a shock
anticipated to occur 20 quarters in the future (outside the time scale of the graph), causing an
inflow of capital in the Home economy.30 The shock is normalized to produce an initial capital
inflow as high as 1 percent of Home GDP. As shown by the first graph in the upper left corner,
the stock of foreign debt increases exogenously along the optimal adjustment path. The size of
capital flows is excessive: the wealth gap (shown in the graph in the upper right corner) jumps
to a positive value and remains constant, according to (14). Both the capital inflows and the
wealth gap are exogenous to macroeconomic adjustment and policy and, hence independent of
LCP and PCP.
The remaining graphs in the figure distinguish between LCP economies (continuous lines)
and PCP economies (dashed lines). The price response (lower left corner) shows that the
monetary stance is relatively expansionary under PCP (GDP-deflator inflation is positive),
contractionary under LCP (CPI inflation is negative).
Comparing the two economies highlights an important result. Under the optimal policy, the
real exchange rate is always less volatile under PCP (where monetary authorities lean against
appreciation) than under LCP (where monetary authorities exacerbate misalignment). Ana-
lytically, this follows from observing that under strict inflation targeting, the real exchange
rate response under LCP (CPI targeting) is the same as under PCP (GDP deflator target-
ing), and thus equal to the natural rate allocation bQnat = − (2aH − 1)fWt. Relative to this
natural rate allocation, we have shown that the optimal policy makes the real exchange rate
less volatile under PCP, and more volatile under LCP. Correspondingly, the real exchange rate
always undershoots its long-run value under PCP–and overshoots under LCP. Because of the
expenditure-switching e§ects of the exchange rate, however, the output gap is more negative
under PCP.31
5 Optimal trade-o§s varying trade elasticities
In this section, we generalize our analysis by relaxing the assumption of a unitary trade elasticity.
This allows us to extend the analysis in at least three directions. First, unlike in the CO
economies, cross-border flows also respond to shocks to productivity–in addition to shocks
to preferences for saving and/or changes in taxes or capital controls. We can thus consider
di§erent types of business cycle disturbances. Second, the wealth gap fWt associated with capital
inflows (excessive relative to the first-best allocation) that is triggered by news shocks can also
be negative–a negative fWt implies that, in spite of ine¢ciently large capital inflows, Home
relative wealth is ine¢ciently low. Policy prescriptions will thus need to take this into account,
30The parameter values are as follows: φ = σ = 1, aH = .75, β = .99, α =.75.
31Analytically, this follows from comparing the expression for the output gaps under PCP, the natural allocation
and LCP, whereas, since ν2 < {2,
(1− aH) (β{2 − 1)
β{2
> (1− aH)
-
2aH
(βν2 − 1)
βν2
− (β{2 − 1)
β{2
.
> (1− aH)
-
1− 2aH
7
1− (βν2 − 1)
βν2
8.
.
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in comparison with the CO economies. Finally, capital flows may no longer be exogenous to
monetary policy. We can thus characterize how optimal monetary policy a§ects the size of
ine¢cient cross-border borrowing and lending.
To keep the analytical complexity at a minimum, we restrict our attention to “news shocks”
only–no contemporaneous shock will appear in the equations to follow.32 For news shocks,
when σ = 1, η = 0 but φ 6= 1, the natural rate allocation di§ers from Table 2 only in the
following, crucial, dimension:33
eY naH,t = − (1− aH) [2aH (φ− 1) + 1]fWnat+s = bBnat . (35)
Thus, while a capital inflow ( bBnat < 0) will invariably lead to a negative output gap, the
associated wealth gap, fWnat , may be positive or negative, depending on the value of the trade
elasticity. Specifically, given bBnat < 0,
fWnat > 0 if φ > 2aH − 12aH ≤ 1/2. (36)
Given fWnat , however, all the other gaps behave exactly the same as in Table 2–they therefore
depend on the elasticity φ through the response of the wealth gap. As shown above, for fWnat >
0, capital inflows appreciate the exchange rate, the Home currency is overvalued and Home
domestic demand is excessive. The opposite is true when, for elasticities below the threshold
above, fWnat < 0: capital inflows are associated with real depreciation and the Home real
exchange rate is undervalued; Home demand is too low.
5.1 Monetary policy and the transfer problem
The implications of capital inflows for relative prices and the exchange rate are best understood
in light of the “transfer problem,” the classical controversy in open economy macro originated by
the debate between Keynes and Ohlin about the e§ects of war reparation payments on the terms
of trade of a country (see Keynes [1929a,b,c] and Ohlin [1929a,b]). Under incomplete markets,
capital inflows into Home are e§ectively a transfer from Foreign. From a global perspective,
because of home bias in demand, if relative prices did not adjust, higher savings by Foreign
residents and higher dissaving by Home residents would translate into an excess supply of Foreign
goods. Equilibrium unavoidably requires a relative price adjustment–as JohnWilliamson would
put it, there is no “immaculate transfer” (see Krugman [2007]).
In an equilibrium in which fWt > 0, substitution e§ects from the real exchange rate are
stronger than income e§ects: equilibrium adjustment to a transfer occurs via Home real ap-
preciation, redirecting world demand towards Foreign goods. Because of the fall in the relative
price of Foreign output, Foreign incomes fall and Home incomes rise by more than the size of
the transfer at constant prices–the problem stressed by Keynes.
However, when fWt < 0–corresponding to the case in which Home and Foreign goods
32Contemporaneous shocks mainly a§ect the relation between capital flows and the sign of the wealth gap;
nevertheless, given the latter, the optimal monetary policy response is the same for both contemporaneous and
anticipated shocks.
33However, for φ 6= 1, the natural rate allocation is not equivalent any longer to that under CPI stability and
LCP.
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are strong complement–the income e§ects from relative price adjustment are stronger than
substitution e§ects. In response to Home capital inflows, there is no equilibrium with Home ap-
preciation/Foreign depreciation, because this would drive Foreign demand too low for the goods
markets to clear at global level. Equilibrium requires Foreign appreciation/Home depreciation
(see Corsetti et al. [2008a]).
The relative strength of income versus substitution e§ects has crucial implications for mon-
etary policy design. As we will see below, in economies where the trade elasticity is su¢ciently
low that bBt < 0 and fWt < 0, sustaining domestic demand and output in response to capital
inflows and currency undervaluation becomes the overriding concern of monetary policy: the
optimal monetary stance is expansionary–for any degree of exchange rate pass-through and
openness.34
5.2 Low pass-through (LCP) economies
The equilibrium relation between capital flows and the wealth gap in LCP economies is shown
in Table 5, together with the full solution for the dynamics of capital flows under the optimal
policy. The two expressions in the table depend only on exogenous shocks, and (through the
t.i.p. term)35 on the current and anticipated future evolution of relative prices in the first-best
allocation, una§ected by policy. Thus, a first remarkable and arguably surprising result is that,
in LCP economies, as long as η = 0 and σ = 1 cross-border capital flows and the wealth gap
remain independent of policy even if the trade elasticity is di§erent from unity (the case of CO
economies).
Table 5: Capital flows under LCP and with news shocks, for φ 6= 1
(1− aH)
h
1 + 2aH (φ− 1) (βν2−1)βν2
i fWt = −5 bBt − β−1 bBt−16+
2aH (1− aH) (φ− 1)
P1
j=0 ν
−j−1
2 Et
h5bT fbt+j+1 − bT fbt+j6− β−1 5bT fbt+j − bT fbt+j−16i
bBt − bBt−1 = 2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)ν1ν2(1−βν1)
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
5
β−1 bBt−1 − bBt−16+ t.i.p
From the table, it is apparent that the trade elasticity φ nonetheless matters for bBt andfWt in two crucial respects. It determines, first, whether a given “news shock” translates into
ine¢cient borrowing or lending; and, second, whether bBt and fWt have the same or the opposite
sign. Di§erently from the natural allocation above (generally unfeasible in LCP economies),
34 It is worth stressing that no such e§ect would materialize were markets complete: perfect risk diversification
would eliminate any adverse income e§ects from shocks and exchange rate movements. Recall from Section 3.3.1
that in the first-best allocation news shocks would not trigger any financial flow across borders, so that in a bond
economy all capital inflows in the natural allocation are invariably excessive, irrespective of the sign of cWnat .
35The terms independent of policy (t.i.p.) in the table are:
t.i.p.=
-
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
.
β
P1
j=0 β
jEt
h*bζC,t+j+1 − bζ∗C,t+j+1,− *bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j,i
+2aH (1− aH) (φ− 1)P1s=0 ν−s−12 Et h*bT fbt+s+1 − bT fbt+s,− β−1 *bT fbt+s − bT fbt+s−1,i
−2aH (1− aH) (φ− 1)
-
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
.
·
n
β
P1
j=0 β
jEt
h*bT fbt+j+1 − bT fbt+j,i +
P1
j=0 β
j
24 P1s=0 ν−s−12 Et h*bT fbt+j+s+1 − bT fbt+j+s,− β−1 *bT fbt+j+s − bT fbt+j+s−1,i
− (1− ν1)β
hPj
s=0 ν
j−s
1
*P1
h=0 ν
−h−1
2 Et
h*bT fbt+h+s+1 − bT fbt+h+s,− β−1 *bT fbt+h+s − bT fbt+h+s−1,i,i
359=; .
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the threshold value of the trade elasticity below which bBt and fWt have the same sign no longer
depends exclusively on the home bias parameter, and di§ers depending on the shocks hitting
the economy. For the case of taste shocks, the threshold is:36
φ <
2aH − βν2(βν2−1)
2aH
< 1.
This threshold is smaller, the more open the economies (aH ! 1/2,φ ≥ 0) and the higher the
degree of price stickiness (ν2 ! 1/β,so that βν2(βν2−1) ! 1,φ ≥ 0)–resulting in a lower degree of
pass-through . For the case of anticipated productivity shocks, the threshold is:
φ <
2aH − βν2(βν2−1) (1− βν1)
2aH
< 1.
Since ν1 ≤ 1 < β−1 ≤ ν2, this expression is unambiguously above the one derived for the case
of taste shocks.37
A second remarkable result in our LCP economies is that, given the sign and paths of bBt
and fWt in response to shocks (from Table 5), the trade elasticity φ does not enter directly
the expressions for the response of inflation, demand gaps and the real exchange rate. Indeed,
provided contemporaneous shocks are excluded from the analysis, these expressions are exactly
the same as in Table 3, derived for the CO economies with a unitary elasticity.
From Table 3, we know that, in response to shocks that cause a capital inflow, bBt < 0
associated with a positive wealth gap, fWt > 0, the Home monetary authorities will optimally
let inflation decline, at the cost of exacerbating the Home real exchange rate appreciation
(and overshooting) in the short run–they will implement a monetary tightening. Similar to
our earlier analysis, the extent to which the optimal policy response translates into a fall in
relative consumption will depend on the degrees of openness and stickiness of import prices, the
latter in turn determining the degree of exchange rate pass-through. A variable for which the
trade elasticity parameter φ makes a di§erence, however, is the welfare-relevant output gap. Its
impact response to the optimal contractionary stance is:
eYH,t0 = − (1− aH) !(β{2 − 1)β{2 − 2aH
-
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
− φ(βν2 − 1)
βν2
.# fWt0 Q 0. (37)
36As shown above, with σ = 1 and η = 0, the terms-of-trade response to (current or anticipated) taste shocks
in the first-best allocation is eT fbt = 0. So, the expressions in Table 5 simplify as follows:
(1− aH)
h
1 + 2aH (φ− 1) (βν2−1)βν2
i cWt = −* bBt − β−1 bBt−1,
bBt − bBt−1 = 2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)ν1ν2(1−βν1)
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
*
β−1 bBt−1 − bBt−1,
+
-
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
.
β
P1
j=0 β
jEt
h*bζC,t+j+1 − bζ∗C,t+j+1,− *bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j,i
from which it is easy to derive the threshold in the text. Note that the first-best terms of trade eT fbt+s in Table 5
are di§erent from zero for productivity shocks.
37This result is apparent from the fact that bBt < 0 necessarily implies that the sum of the last two lines in
the second expression in the Table 3 have the opposite sign and are larger in absolute value than the third line
in the same expression, which also appears in the equation for cWt. The threshold is su¢cient for the term
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2
1+2aH(φ−1) (βν2−1)βν2(1−βν1)
to be non negative.
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It is easy to show that the response of this gap to the optimal monetary contraction is unam-
biguously negative for values of φ su¢ciently above 1.
The optimal policy response to excessive inflows is quite di§erent in economies where do-
mestic and foreign goods are highly complementary and the e§ects of the “transfer” change
sign, for values of the trade elasticity below the thresholds above. With bBt < 0 and fWt < 0, the
(exogenous) capital inflows are associated with ine¢ciently low domestic demand: monetary
authorities optimally focus on domestic demand stabilization (see Table 3). The optimal stance
is relatively expansionary (rather than contractionary) at Home, up to the point of bringing the
Home output gap into positive territory (as follows from assessing (37) for φ! 0). Relative to
strict inflation targeting, Home aggregate demand and economic activity will be stronger, while
the real exchange rate will clearly be weaker–i.e., even more undervalued.38
5.3 High pass-through (PCP) economies
The allocation under the optimal policy in PCP economies is shown in Table 6, once again
abstracting from contemporaneous shocks. Di§erent from our results under LPC, it is apparent
that capital flows are no longer independent of the macroeconomic allocation and therefore of
policy. The optimal monetary stance may also a§ect the size of the inflows, even for σ = 1.39
Table 6: Constrained-e¢cient allocation under PCP with news shocks, for φ 6= 1
fWt = A·βP1j=0 βj
24 2aH (φ− 1)Et 55bY fbH,t+j+1 − bY fbF,t+j+16− 5bY fbH,t+j − bY fbF,t+j66+
− (2aH (φ− 1) + 1)Et
55bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j6− 5bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j66
35
bBt = bBt−1 − B·βP1j=0 βj
24 2aH (φ− 1)Et 55bY fbH,t+j+1 − bY fbF,t+j+16− 5bY fbH,t+j − bY fbF,t+j66+
− (2aH (φ− 1) + 1)Et
55bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j6− 5bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j66
35+
2 (1− aH)
h
2aH(φ−1)
4aH(1−aH)(φ−1)+1
i
1−{1
1−βδ1β{1
eYH,t−1
eYH,t = {1 eYH,t−1 − (1− aH)
8<: [2aH (φ− 1) + 1]
(β{2−1)
β{2
fWt+
2aHφ
2aH(φ−1)
2aH(φ−1)+1
1
β{2
5fWt − fWt−16
9=;
θπH,t = (1− {1) eYH,t−1 + (1− aH) (β{2−1)β{2
(
[2aH (φ− 1) + 1]fWt+
−2aHφ 2aH(φ−1)2aH(φ−1)+1
5fWt − fWt−16
)
eTt = 2eYH,t − (2aH − 1)fWt
4aH (1− aH) (φ− 1) + 1
At least three results are worth stressing. First, if exchange rate pass-through is complete,
the threshold for the trade elasticity at which the wealth gap fWt switches sign under the optimal
policy is the same as the one derived for the natural rate allocation (36), and thus identical for
both (anticipated) taste and productivity shocks.40 Together with the results from the previous
38With σ 6= 1, capital flows and wealth gaps respond to monetary policy. Yet, under reasonably general
conditions, the results discussed in this subsection will go through: the sign of monetary policy is not determined
by capital flow stabilization. Moreover, as shown in the appendix, for σ > 1 and φ > 1, expansionary monetary
policy always reduces the capital inflow; the opposite happens for σ < 1 and 0 ≤ φ < 1− 1− 2aH−1+
2(1−aH)
σ
2aH
ν2−1
1−ν1
< 1.
39Under PCP it is possible to derive analytically tractable results for any η ≥ 0 and σ ≥ 1. However for
comparability with the LCP case the table reports the solution for the case η = 0 and σ > 0.
40This is so because, in the expression for bBt, first, the coe¢cient B of the term in the shocks is always
non-positive for any value of φ, namely:
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subsection, this establishes that the elasticity threshold below which a capital inflow causes
a negative wealth gap is never larger (whether under LCP or PCP) than in the natural rate
allocation. It is bounded above by 2aH−12aH , which is decreasing in openness (and goes to zero for
aH ! 1/2, the case of no home bias in consumption).
Second, under the optimal policy, the impact response of inflation to capital inflows is always
positive, for any value of the elasticity φ, i.e., whether fWt is positive or negative:41
θπH,t = (1− aH) β{2 − 1
β{2
[4aH (1− aH) (φ− 1) + 1]
fWt
2aH (φ− 1) + 1 > 0.
Hence, the optimal monetary policy is always expansionary on impact (note that, unlike the
case of LCP, there is no switch in the sign of the monetary policy). The trade elasticity, however,
impinges on the inflationary impact of the optimal monetary expansion.
For elasticities above the threshold (36), the optimal policy is similar to the one derived in
the CO economy. Capital inflows associated with ine¢ciently high Home demand (fWt > 0) call
for easier monetary policy at Home (see the inflation expression above), to resist exchange rate
overvaluation. The welfare-relevant output gap nonetheless remains negative, despite the fact
that such a stance stokes inflationary pressures.
For elasticities below the threshold (36) such that bBt and fWt are both negative, the ex-
pansionary Home policy stance may even bring the welfare-relevant output gap into positive
territory. As shown in the appendix, for low enough trade elasticities, the optimal Home mon-
etary policy stance is increasingly driven by the need to prop up an ine¢ciently low domestic
demand. In response to the capital inflow, Home residents’ consumption actually falls in relative
terms for values of φ below the following threshold:
φ ≤ (2aH − 1)
2aH
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
≤ (2aH − 1)
2aH
.
It is for this region of elasticities that the optimal monetary boost turns the output gap positive.
Our third result is that, unlike the CO economy and the LCP case, the monetary expansion
now a§ects the size of capital inflows. In general, there are two channels to consider, working
in opposite directions. By leaning against real appreciation, an expansionary monetary policy
discourages capital inflows; by sustaining domestic demand, it raises domestic borrowing. It
can be shown that, under the optimal policy, the first channel prevails for φ > 1: relative to the
benchmark of the natural rate allocation, capital inflows are smaller in absolute value. Yet, for
elasticity values in the range 1 > φ > 2aH−12aH , it is the second channel that prevails: the optimal
B =− (1−aH)
4aH(1−aH)(φ−1)+1 ·241− 1−{1{2−1 4aH(1−aH)(φ−1)[2aH(φ−1)+1]2 4aH(1−aH)(φ−1)+14aH(1−aH)(φ−1)+1+4aH(1−aH)φ 4a2H(φ−1)2[2aH(φ−1)+1]2 (1−β)β({2−1)
35 ≤ 0. Second, the sign of the coef-
ficient A multiplying the same term in the expression for cWt, given by
A = [2aH (φ− 1) + 1]
−1
4aH (1− aH) (φ− 1) + 1 + 4aH (1− aH)φ 4a
2
H(φ−1)2
[2aH(φ−1)+1]2
(1−β)
β{2(1−β{1)
7 0
depends instead on whether φ is above or below the threshold (36).
41To see why, note that, conditional on bBt < 0, the term on the right-hand side of the expression in the text
is always positive ([2aH (φ− 1) + 1]−1 fWt always has the opposite sign of bBt).
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monetary stance magnifies net borrowing relative to the natural rate allocation.42
6 Conclusions
As a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis, much research has been devoted to recon-
sider the set of policy tools and measures that can be activated to insulate national economies
from the ebb and flows of cross-border capital flows. In this paper, we have taken the perspec-
tive of monetary policy decision making, and analyzed what monetary instruments can deliver
when additional tools are not readily available and/or are of limited e§ectiveness. Our main
question is how monetary policy can manage the e§ects of ine¢cient capital flows on domestic
macroeconomic dynamic and welfare, by optimally trading o§ domestic and external objectives.
Our study provides key analytical insight into the e¢cient resolution of this trade-o§. When
international capital markets fall short of delivering a high degree of risk sharing (so that capital
flows are associated with currency misalignment), the design of optimal monetary rules hinges
on recognizing the direct and indirect relevance of competitiveness for domestic stabilization and
welfare. With a high pass-through, indeed, the optimal response to ine¢cient capital inflows is
directed to contain misalignment and overappreciation, tolerating a temporary surge in domestic
inflation. However, the stabilization of aggregate demand is a priority–at the costs of missing
out on external objectives and temporary below-target inflation–when imperfect pass-through
mutes the price competitiveness e§ects of exchange rate appreciation, and trade elasticities are
not too low.
Our results, derived under commitment, can be brought to bear on the case of cooperation
under discretion, where policymakers are not able to improve the short-run trade-o§s among
competing goals by credibly guiding expectations of future policy rates and inflation. As is
well known, in the closed economy counterpart of our model, or in its version under complete
markets, optimal targeting rules derived under discretion will include all variables (a part of
inflation) in levels, rather than in growth rates. Namely, under discretion monetary authorities
cannot credibly pursue a nominal anchor in level. This will also be the case in the specification
of our bond economy where capital flows are exogenous to monetary policy. In either our CO
economies, or our LCP economies with σ = 1 and α = 0, the targeting rules under discretion can
be easily derived from our analysis in Section 3–crossing out lagged terms. Economic dynamics
can be readily derived from our analysis in Sections 4 and 5. In more general specifications of
the model, however, the accumulation of net foreign assets and liabilities will change the state
of the economy over time: targeting rules derived under discretion will generally include a
term capturing the optimal policy response to foreign debt accumulation, complicating their
analytical characterization.
An important consequence of the inability of discretionary policymakers to credibly pursue
a nominal anchor is that the nominal price level and the exchange rate will have a unit root:
any rise of inflation above target will not be o§set by credible policies pursuing a fall in inflation
below target in the future. For our baseline specifications with exogenous capital flows, then,
it is easy to verify that, with the optimal policy in place, inflation and exchange rate volatility
will be higher under discretion than under commitment.
42As shown in the appendix, an expansionary monetary shock always decreases capital inflows for φ > 1.
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Among possible directions for future research, an important one concerns the analysis of
strategic interactions among policymakers. Numerical analyses of the Nash equilibrium under
incomplete markets and PCP suggest that, although policymakers have an incentive to ma-
nipulate the terms of trade of the country in their own national interests, incomplete markets
increase the weight attached to stabilization of domestic incomes (see e.g. Rabitsch [2012] and,
for a small open economy, De Paoli [2009]). Based on our results, we can further observe that
ine¢cient capital flows have strong redistributive e§ects across border. We have seen that
cooperative policies attempt to redress these e§ects: in our analysis, when the optimal mone-
tary policy at Home is either a contraction or an expansion, the Foreign monetary stance has
the opposite sign. Without cooperation, however, these redistributive e§ects of capital inflows
inherently create room for conflicts and strategic behavior.
Relatedly, while in this paper we focus on the benchmark cases of PCP and LCP, the evidence
on the importance of pricing in vehicle currencies strongly motivates further work exploring the
case of asymmetric pass-through, or Dominant Currency Pricing (DCP, see Gopinath [2016]
and Casas et al. [2016]). An important question is which direction, when facing a capital inflow
with currency overvaluation, monetary policy will take in the country which issues the dominant
currency.
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7 Appendix
7.1 The transmission of monetary policy with imperfect capital markets
In this appendix, we analyze how monetary policy impacts the welfare-relevant gaps defined in
the main text. As is well known, there are notable di§erences in the transmission of monetary
decisions across LCP and PCP economies. Specifically, a monetary expansion causing nominal
depreciation weakens the terms of trade under PCP but tends to strengthen the terms of trade
under LCP. Here, our specific interest is to understand how monetary transmission is a§ected
by financial distortions.
Starting with the LCP model, consider for simplicity a Home monetary shock such that
CPI inflation follows an autoregressive process, aHπHt+s + (1− aH)πFt+s = ρsπ > 0, s ≥ 0–
assuming that the Foreign monetary authority responds by keeping CPI price stability, i.e.,
aHπ
∗
Ft+s+(1− aH)π∗Ht+s = 0, s ≥ 0. For the reasons explained in the text, we focus on the case
η = 0, when the LCP model is relatively straightforward to solve. With η = 0, the responses
of the key variables are given in Table A1. In the table, since an expansionary Home monetary
policy shock is obviously ine¢cient (all first-best deviations are equal to zero), the responses of
welfare-relevant gaps coincide with the response of macro variables.
Table A1: The e§ect of a monetary policy shock under LCPfWt+s = fWt = (σ−1)
2(1−aH)+σ
h
2aH
!
(φ−1) 1−ν1
ν2−1+1
#
−1
i 1−β
(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
π
eBt = (1− aH)K2aH (φ− 1) (βν2−1)βν2 11−βν1fWt + (σ−1)σ (1−ρ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
βπ
L
eTt+s + e∆t+s = −1−νs+111−ν1 (βν2−1)βν2 fWt+se∆t+s = (1−ρβ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ − (2aH − 1)
h
1− 1−ν
s+1
1
1−ν1
(βν2−1)
βν2
i fWt+seQt+s = (1−ρβ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ − (2aH − 1)fWt+s
σeYH,t+s = aH (1−ρβ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ − (1− aH)
h
1 + 2aH
5
σφ
1−νs+11
1−ν1
(βν2−1)
βν2
− 1
6i fWt+s
σeYF,t+s = (1− aH) (1−ρβ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ + (1− aH)
h
1 + 2aH
5
σφ
1−νs+11
1−ν1
(βν2−1)
βν2
− 1
6i fWt+s
σ eDt+s = (1−ρβ)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ + 2 (1− aH)fWt+s.
When markets are incomplete, a monetary shock generally causes the wealth gap fWt to de-
viate from zero (recall that in the bond economy EtfWt+1 = fWt)–implying that the e§ects
of a monetary policy shock under incomplete markets are generally di§erent than those under
complete markets. In a few notable special cases, however, the e§ects of monetary policy are
the same as in economies with complete markets. One such case is σ = 1 (log consumption
utility), whereas fWt = 0, and neither capital flows eBt, nor the relative price misalignment,eTt+ e∆t, are a§ected by monetary policy. In this special case, a monetary easing unambiguously
results in positive domestic and foreign output gaps, a positive real exchange rate gap, and a
higher relative demand gap. Relative to this benchmark, if the gap fWt is positive the e§ects of
monetary policy on the domestic output and the real exchange rate gaps are smaller, while the
foreign output and the relative demand gaps react more. These di§erences reflect the fact that
the misalignment eTt + e∆t is negative when fWt > 0, implying “expenditure switching” in favor
of Foreign exports. The opposite is true if the wedge is negative: the domestic output and real
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exchange rate gaps react by more, while the transmission abroad is muted.
A monetary expansion can open a wealth gap in di§erent directions, depending on elastici-
ties. To see this, consider the following threshold expressed in terms of the trade elasticity:
φ > 1− 2aH − 1 +
2(1−aH)
σ
2aH
ν2−1
1−ν1
≥ 0.
A monetary easing brings about a positive gap fWt either when σ > 1 and φ is above the
threshold shown above; or when σ < 1 and φ is below the threshold.
By the same token, a monetary expansion can lead to either an external surplus or an
external deficit. From the second equation in the table, a su¢cient condition for a monetary
easing to lead to an ine¢cient capital outflow eBt = bBt > 0 is that both σ > 1 and φ > 1–
recall that bBfbt = 0. A su¢cient condition for inflows, eBt < 0, instead, is σ < 1 and φ below
the threshold. It follows that, depending on parameter values, a positive gap fWt > 0 brought
about by a monetary expansion may be associated with either outflows or inflows of capital.
These in turn would attenuate (or amplify) the e§ects of monetary policy on domestic output
and the real exchange rate (domestic consumption and foreign output).
The transmission of monetary policy under PCP is shown in Table A2. Relative to the
previous table, monetary easing is now modelled as an increase in domestic PPI inflation
πHt+s = ρ
sπ > 0, s ≥ 0, again under the assumption that the Foreign monetary authority
responds by keeping PPI price stability, i.e., π∗Ft+s = 0, s ≥ 0 and η = 0.
Table A2: The e§ect of a monetary policy shock under PCPfWt+s = fWt = (2aHφ−1)σ−(2aH−1)1+(2aHφ−1)σ−(2aH−1) (1−β)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
πeBt = (1− aH) (2aHφ−1)σ−(2aH−1)σ 1(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
βπ
eQt+s = (2aH − 1) eTt+s = (2aH − 1) ! 1(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ − fWt+s#
σeYH,t+s = [1 + 2aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1)] 1(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ − (1− aH) 2aH(σφ−1)+1σ fWt+s
σeYF,t+s = −2aH (1− aH) (σφ− 1) 1(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ + (1− aH) 2aH(σφ−1)+1σ fWt+s
σ eDt+s = (2aH−1)(1−αβ)(1−α)
α
ρsπ + 2 (1− aH)fWt+s.
An expansionary Home monetary policy shock also causes the gap fWt to deviate from zero
under PCP: under incomplete markets, the e§ects of a monetary policy shock do not coincide
with those under complete markets. Again there are a few notable exceptions: under PCP,
the special case in which monetary policy a§ects neither fWt (= 0) nor capital flows arises when
φ =
1+
2aH−1
σ
2aH
; if σ = 1, then, this requires φ = 1–a Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregator. In
this special case, just like under complete markets, a monetary easing unambiguously results in a
higher domestic output, relative demand and real exchange rate gaps. However, foreign output
is a§ected only when σφ 6= 1, and increases if σφ < 1, namely, when goods are Edgeworth-
complement. Relative to the benchmark with φ =
1+
2aH−1
σ
2aH
, similar to LCP, a positive (negative)
wealth gap means that the e§ects of monetary policy on domestic output and the real exchange
rate are smaller (larger) than under complete markets, while domestic consumption and foreign
output react more (less). These e§ects reflect the fact that the response of the terms of trade,
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eTt, is also smaller (larger), implying a weaker (stronger) expenditure switching in favor of Home
goods. Specifically, the wealth gap is positive when the following conditions hold:
φ >
1 + 2aH−1σ
2aH
,φ <
1− 2(1−aH)σ
2aH
.
From the second equation in the table, it is apparent that, for a monetary easing to lead
to an ine¢cient capital outflow on impact, eBt > 0, it must be the case that φ > 1+ 2aH−1σ2aH .
Otherwise, it leads to capital inflows. Therefore, also under PCP a positive fWt > 0 may be
associated with either outflows or inflows of capital, in turn attenuating or amplifying the e§ects
of monetary policy on domestic output and the real exchange rate (domestic consumption and
foreign output).
7.2 Costly intermediation and stationarity of net foreign assets
Our results so far have been derived in a specification of the model in which both bBt andcWt are not stationary. In this subsection, we show that nonstationarity does not play any
substantive role. In the literature, a standard approach to ensure that bBt is stationary in bond
economies is to assume that its changes are subject to some (portfolio) adjustment costs; Gabaix
and Maggiori [2015] have recently shown that this sluggish adjustment can result from costly
intermediation of cross-border flows when financial intermediaries operate under borrowing
constraints. In our framework, a simple way to capture the same idea is to posit deviations
from the uncovered interest rate parity condition that are proportional to net foreign assets:
EtcWt+1 − cWt = −δ bBt.
With this modification, the solutions for bBt and cWt in the CO economy become:
bBt = γ1 bBt + (1− aH) 1X
j=0
γ−j−12 Et
h5bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j6− 5bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j6i ,
cWt =  bBt−1 − β bBt
(1− aH)β
!
−
5bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6
= −
245bζC,t − bζ∗C,t6+ 1X
j=0
γ−j−12 Et
h5bζC,t+1+j − bζ∗C,t+1+j6− 5bζC,t+j − bζ∗C,t+j6i− γ1 − β(1− aH)β bBt−1
35 .
where β < γ1 < 1 < γ2 are the roots of the characteristic equation associated with the above
second-order di§erence equation:
βγ2 − (1 + β + βδ) γ + 1 = 0.
Both cWt and bBt are now stationary, but still functions of exogenous shocks only, so the optimal
targeting rules are the same as those derived above under both LCP and PCP. Therefore,
optimal monetary policy will react in the same way to a capital inflow, by tightening under
LCP and easing under PCP (although of course with a di§erent strength). Clearly, setting
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δ = 0 in the last expression leads to γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 1/β, which yields expressions (29) and
(30) above.
7.3 Determinants of the optimal Home monetary stance under PCP with a
non-unitary elasticity
To prove the result in Subsection 5.2 in the text, we start noting that, for low enough trade
elasticities, the impact response of relative consumption to capital inflows,
eCt = 2 (1− aH)fWt
2aH (φ− 1) + 1| {z }
sign(− bBt)
(
2aH (φ− 1) + 1+
(2aH−1)
β{2
)
,
switches sign and becomes negative. This will be the case for values of φ below the threshold
φ ≤ (2aH − 1)
2aH
(β{2 − 1)
β{2
≤ (2aH − 1)
2aH
< 1.
where an expansionary monetary policy stance is motivated by an ine¢ciently low domestic
demand. The monetary boosts causes the output gap to become consistently positive. On
impact, the optimal response can be written as follows
eYH,t = − (1− aH)fWt
2aH (φ− 1) + 1| {z }
sign( bBt)
1
β{2
(
(β{2 − 1) [2aH (φ− 1) + 1]2+
4a2Hφ (φ− 1)
)
,
where the term outside the curly brackets has the same sign as capital inflows bBt. Therefore,
whether the optimal policy turns the output gap positive or negative depends on the sign of the
term in curly brackets, in turn a function of φ. For φ < 1, the second term in the curly brackets
(4a2Hφ (φ− 1)) is always negative, and converges to zero as φ ! 0. The first term is a square
and thus always positive, but converges to zero as φ converges to the cuto§ point 2aH−12aH from
above; it then becomes increasingly positive for lower values of elasticities. This implies that,
under the optimally expansionary monetary policy, there is a range of elasticities around the
cuto§ point for which the output gap is positive. This range becomes larger, the closer β{2 is
to 1, i.e., the stickier prices are, since the first term in curly brackets goes to zero. Importantly,
this is in contrast to the natural rate allocation in which the output gap is negative for any
value of the elasticity (see Table 5).
An expansionary stance dictated by concerns with domestic stabilization of course exacer-
bates the real misalignment. Under the optimal policy, the response of the terms-of-trade gap
is
eTt = 2eYH,t − (2aH − 1)fWt
4aH (1− aH) (φ− 1) + 1
= −
fWt
2aH (φ− 1) + 1| {z }
1
β{2
sign( bBt)
(
β{2 [2aH (φ− 1) + 1]
−2 (1− aH)
)
,
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where the term in curly brackets is positive if
φ ≥ 1 + (2aH − 1) (β{2 − 1)
β{2
< 1,
and is negative if φ ≤ 2aH−12aH . It follows that, for φ ≤
2aH−1
2aH
, the optimal Home monetary
expansion causes the terms of trade to be excessively weak.
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